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ESSAY 
Empirically Informed Regulation 
Cass R. Sunstein† 
Our regulatory system . . . must measure, and seek to improve, the 
actual results of regulatory requirements. 
. . . 
[E]ach agency shall identify and consider regulatory approaches 
that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of 
choice for the public. These approaches include warnings, 
appropriate default rules, and disclosure requirements as well as 
provision of information to the public in a form that is clear and 
intelligible. 
Executive Order 13563
1 
      
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a number of social scientists have been 
incorporating empirical findings about human behavior into economic 
models. These findings offer useful insights for thinking about 
regulation and its likely consequences. They also offer some 
suggestions about the appropriate design of effective, low-cost, choice-
preserving approaches to regulatory problems, including disclosure 
requirements, default rules, and simplification.
2 
                                                                                                                         
 †   Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management 
and Budget, Executive Office of the President.  
  1  Executive Order 13563 §§ 1, 4, 76 Fed Reg 3821, 3821–22 (2011). 
  2 See  generally  William J. Congdon, Jeffrey R. Kling, and Sendhil Mullainathan, Policy 
and Choice: Public Finance through the Lens of Behavioral Economics (Brookings 2011) 
(describing implications of behavioral economics for public finance); Peter Diamond and Hannu 
Vartiainen, eds, Behavioral Economics and Its Applications (Princeton 2007) (examining 
behavioral dimensions of public economics; economic development; law and economics; and 
health, wage determination, and organization economics); Hugh Schwartz, A Guide to 
Behavioral Economics (Higher Education 2008) (providing an introduction to behavioral 
economics for a general audience). The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
has provided guidance on disclosure and simplification as regulatory tools. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Administrator, OIRA, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
Disclosure and Simplification as Regulatory Tools (June 18, 2010), online at 
 1350  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
A general lesson is that small, inexpensive policy initiatives can 
have large and highly beneficial effects.
3 The purpose of this Essay is 
to explore relevant evidence, to catalogue recent practices and 
reforms, and to discuss some implications for regulatory policy. And 
while the primary focus is on small, inexpensive regulatory initiatives, 
there is a still more general theme, which involves the importance of 
ensuring that regulations have strong empirical foundations, both 
through careful analysis in advance and through retrospective review 
of what works and what does not. 
I.  FINDINGS AND CONCERNS 
A. Findings 
For purposes of regulation, the central findings
4 of recent social 
science research fall in four categories. What follows is not meant to 
be a comprehensive account of recent empirical findings; the focus is 
on those findings that have particular importance to regulatory policy. 
1. Inertia and procrastination. 
a) Default rules often have a large effect on social outcomes. Both 
private and public institutions often establish “default rules”—rules 
that determine the result if people make no affirmative choice at all. 
In part because of the power of inertia, default rules can be extremely 
important. In the domain of retirement savings, for example, the 
default rule has significant consequences. When people are asked 
whether they want to opt in to a retirement plan, the level of 
participation is far lower than if they are asked whether they want to 
opt out.
5 Automatic enrollment significantly increases participation.   
                                                                                                                         
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure_principles.pdf 
(visited Jan 15, 2011). This memorandum is provided as Appendix B.  
  3  For a similar claim in another context, see Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Poor 
Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Poverty 267–73 (PublicAffairs 2011).  
  4  See generally Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, eds, Heuristics and 
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Cambridge 2002) (compiling research on how 
people make judgments); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, eds, Choices, Values, and Frames 
(Cambridge 2000). For a recent discussion of many relevant findings, see generally Daniel 
Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011). 
  5  See Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) 
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q J Econ 1149, 1184 (2001). For a discussion of the effect 
of inertia on choice of travel modes, see Alessandro Innocenti, Patrizia Lattarulo, and Maria 
Grazia Pazienza, Heuristics and Biases in Travel Mode Choice *20 (LabSi Working Paper 
No 27/2009, Dec 2009), online at http://www.labsi.org/wp/labsi27.pdf (visited Apr 3, 2011). 2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1351 
More generally, people may decline to change from the status 
quo even if the costs of change are low and the benefits substantial.
6 It 
follows that complexity can have serious adverse effects by increasing 
the power of inertia, and that ease and simplification (including 
reduction of paperwork burdens) can produce significant benefits. 
These benefits include increased compliance with law and greater 
participation in public programs. 
b) Procrastination can have significant adverse effects. According 
to standard economic theory, people will consider both the short term 
and the long term. They will take account of relevant uncertainties; the 
future may be unpredictable, and significant changes may occur over 
time. They will appropriately discount the future; it may be better to 
have money, or a good event, a week from now than a decade from 
now. In practice, however, some people procrastinate or neglect to 
take steps that impose small short-term costs but that promise large 
long-term gains.
7 People may, for example, delay enrolling in a 
retirement plan,
8 starting to exercise, seeing a doctor, ceasing to 
smoke, or using some valuable, cost-saving technology.
9  
                                                                                                                         
  6  See William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decisionmaking, 
1 J Risk & Uncertainty 7, 8 (1988); Madrian and Shea, 116 Q J Econ at 1176–77 (cited in note 5). 
With respect to the effects of complexity, consider the finding that efforts to ease and simplify 
household water connections in Morocco, and thus to create a private tap at home, produced 
substantial time gains and improvements in self-reported well-being. See Florencia Devoto, et al, 
Happiness on Tap: Piped Water Adoption in Urban Morocco *3–6 (MIT Department of 
Economics Working Paper No 11-05, Apr 2011), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1803576 (visited Aug 24, 2011). A noteworthy finding here is that the 
mere reduction of informational and administrative barriers produced large benefits, thus 
“underscor[ing] the power of the status quo and the potentially high returns of designing 
programs with simplicity and ease of access in mind.”
 
 Id at *6. See also Peter Tufano, Just Keep 
My Money! Supporting Tax-Time Savings with US Savings Bonds *26 (Harvard Business School 
Working Paper No 09-059, Aug 2010), online at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-059.pdf 
(visited Aug 24, 2011) (finding that savings products, in particular US savings  bonds,  are 
significantly more likely to be chosen if the process for choosing them is eased and simplified). 
  7  See Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q J 
Econ 121, 121–22 (2001); Richard H. Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using 
Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J Pol Econ S164, S168–69 (2004). In the 
context of poverty, see Banerjee and Duflo, Poor Economics at 64–68 (cited in note 3). For a 
popular treatment, see generally Piers Steel, The Procrastination Equation: How to Stop Putting 
Things Off and Start Getting Stuff Done (Harper 2011). 
  8  See Dean Karlan, et al, Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving *1, 
14 (Yale Economics Department Working Paper No 82, 2010), online at http://karlan.yale.edu/p 
/Top-of-Mind-April2010.pdf (visited Apr 3, 2011). 
  9  See Esther Duflo, Michael Kremer, and Jonathan Robinson, Nudging Farmers to Use 
Fertilizer: Evidence from Kenya *4–5 (NBER Working Paper No 15131, 2009), online at 
http://econ.arizona.edu/docs/Seminar_Papers/DufloS09.pdf (visited Apr 3, 2011) (finding that 
farmers in western Kenya do not make economically advantageous fertilizer investments, but 
that a small, time-limited discount on the cost of acquiring fertilizer can increase investments, 
thus producing higher welfare than either a laissez-faire approach or large subsidies).  1352  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
One implication is that some people make choices that have 
short-term net benefits but long-term net costs (as is the case, for 
many, with smoking cigarettes). Another implication is that some 
people fail to make choices that have short-term net costs but long-
term net benefits (as is the case, for some, with choosing more energy-
efficient products). Procrastination, inertia, hyperbolic discounting,
10 
and associated problems of self-control
11 are especially troublesome 
when the result is a small short-term gain at the expense of a large 
long-term loss. There is a close connection between procrastination 
and myopia, understood as an excessive focus on the short-term.
12  
When procrastination is creating significant problems, automatic 
enrollment in relevant programs might be helpful. Moreover, complex 
requirements, inconvenience, and lengthy forms are likely to make the 
situation worse and perhaps unexpectedly so. 
c) When people are informed of the benefits or risks of engaging in 
certain actions, they are far more likely to act in response to that 
information if they are simultaneously provided with clear, explicit 
information about how to do so.
13 For example, those who are informed 
of the benefits of a vaccine are more likely to become vaccinated if they 
are also given specific plans and maps describing where to go.
14 
Similarly, behavior has been shown to be significantly affected if people 
are informed, not abstractly of the value of “healthy eating,” but 
specifically of the advantages of buying 1 percent milk as opposed to 
whole milk.
15  
In many domains, the identification of a specific, clear, 
unambiguous path or plan has an important effect on social outcomes. 
Complexity or vagueness can ensure inaction, even when people are 
                                                                                                                         
  10 See  David  Laibson,  Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q J Econ 443, 
445 (1997).  
  11  See Richard H. Thaler and H.M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J Pol 
Econ 392, 404 (1981). For an interesting application, see Jonathan H. Gruber and Sendhil 
Mullainathan,  Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier?, 5 Advances in Econ Analysis & 
Pol 1, 20 (2005). 
  12  See Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity 
Premium Puzzle, 110 Q J Econ 73, 88 (1995).  
  13  See Howard Leventhal, Robert Singer, and Susan Jones, Effects of Fear and Specificity of 
Recommendation upon Attitudes and Behavior, 2 J Personality & Soc Psych 20, 27 (1965); David 
W. Nickerson and Todd Rogers, Do You Have a Voting Plan? Implementation Intentions, Voter 
Turnout, and Organic Plan Making, 21 Psych Sci  194,  198  (2010) (showing that people are 
significantly more likely to vote if asked to identify when and where they will vote). For a 
popular treatment with citations to the academic literature, see Chip Heath and Dan Heath, 
Switch: How to Change Things When Change Is Hard 15–17 (Broadway Books 2010). 
  14  See Leventhal, Singer, and Jones, 2 J Personality & Soc Psych at 22, 27–28 (cited in note 13). 
  15  See Heath and Heath, Switch at 15–17 (cited in note 13) (describing the effects of a 
targeted milk marketing campaign in West Virginia, which changed the local market share of 
low-fat milk from 18 percent to 35 percent over a six-month period). 2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1353 
informed about risks and potential improvements.
16 What appears to 
be skepticism or recalcitrance may actually be a product of ambiguity. 
2. Framing and presentation. 
a) People can be influenced by how information is presented or 
“framed.”
17 If, for example, people are informed that they will gain a 
certain amount of money as a result of using energy efficient products, 
they may be less likely to change their behavior than if they are told 
that they will lose the same amount of money as a result of not using 
such products.
18 When patients are told that 90 percent of those who 
have a certain operation are alive after five years, they are more likely 
to elect to have the operation than when they are told that after five 
years, 10 percent of patients are dead.
19 
It follows that a product that is labeled “90 percent fat-free” may 
well be more appealing than one that is labeled “10 percent fat.” It 
also follows that choices are often not solely on the basis of their 
                                                                                                                         
  16  See Jason Riis and Rebecca Ratner, Simplified Nutrition Guidelines to Fight Obesity, in 
Rajeev Batra, Punam Anand Keller, and Victor J. Strecher, eds, Leveraging Consumer 
Psychology for Effective Health Communications: The Obesity Challenge 333, 334 (ME Sharpe 
2011) (discussing the importance of simplicity for health-related communications). For examples 
of relevant advice in connection with dietary guidelines, see also Selected Messages for 
Consumers (Department of Agriculture Jan 2011), online at http://www.cnpp.usda.gov 
/Publications/DietaryGuidelines/2010/PolicyDoc/SelectedMessages.pdf (visited Apr 4, 2011). 
These take the form of relatively specific guidance, such as, “Make half your plate fruits and 
vegetables,” “Switch to fat-free or low-fat (1%) milk,” and “Drink water instead of sugary 
drinks.” Id. See also Katherine L. Milkman, et al, Using Implementation Intentions Prompts to 
Enhance Influenza Vaccination Rates *4–7 (NBER Working Paper No 17183, June 2011), online 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1879044 (visited Aug 24, 2011) (finding 
that people are significantly more likely to become vaccinated if they are given a prompt that 
asks them to write down the date and time when they will do so, while also finding that  a 
prompt that simply asks them to write down the date has no such effect). See also the discussion 
of the replacement of the “Food Pyramid” with the “Food Plate” accompanying notes 118–20. 
  17  See Irwin P. Levin, Sandra L. Schneider, and Gary J. Gaeth, All Frames Are Not Created 
Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects, 76 Org Behav & Hum Dec 
Processes 149, 150 (1998).  
  18  See Marti Hope Gonzales, Elliot Aronson, and Mark A. Costanzo, Using Social 
Cognition and Persuasion to Promote Energy Conservation: A Quasi-Experiment, 18 J Applied 
Soc Psych 1049, 1062 (1988). For a demonstration that people’s decisions about when to claim 
social security benefits are affected by framing, see Jeffrey R. Brown, Arie Kapteyn, and Olivia S. 
Mitchell, Framing Effects and Expected Social Security Claiming Behavior *4–5 (NBER Working 
Paper No 17018, May 2011), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1833155 (visited Aug 24, 2011) (finding that use of “breakeven analysis” leads people to claim 
early and that people are more likely to delay claiming when later claiming is framed as a gain 
rather than a loss). 
  19  See Donald A. Redelmeier, Paul Rozin, and Daniel Kahneman, Understanding Patients’ 
Decisions: Cognitive and Emotional Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 73 (1993). For a discussion of the 
efforts by the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to inform consumers about nutrition by 
preventing potentially confusing framing of fat content (for example, if a label says that meat is 
90 percent lean, it must also say that it contains 10 percent fat), see text accompanying note 89. 1354  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
consequences; assessments may be affected by the relevant frame. The 
importance of the particular frame depends on context. For healthy 
eating, gain-framed and loss-framed appeals do not show substantially 
different effects, while for physical activity, gain-framed appeals have 
been found to be more effective.
20 
b) Information that is vivid and salient can have a larger impact on 
behavior than information that is statistical and abstract.
21 With respect 
to public health, vivid displays can be more effective than abstract 
presentations of statistical risks.
22 This point bears on the design of 
effective warnings. Attention is a scarce resource, and vivid, salient, 
and novel presentations may trigger attention in ways that abstract or 
familiar ones cannot.
23  
In particular, salience greatly matters. Why, for example, do 
people pay bank overdraft fees? One of the many possible answers is 
that such fees are not sufficiently salient to people, and the fees are 
incurred as a result of inattention or inadvertent mistakes. One study 
suggests that limited attention is indeed a source of the problem and 
that once  overdraft fees become salient, they are significantly 
reduced.
24 When people take surveys about such fees, they are less 
likely to incur a fee in the following month, and when they take a 
number of surveys, the issue becomes sufficiently salient that 
overdraft fees are reduced for as long as two years.
25 In many areas, the 
mere act of being surveyed can affect behavior by, for example, 
increasing use of water treatment products (thus promoting health) 
                                                                                                                         
  20  See Daniel J. O’Keefe and Jakob D. Jensen, The Relative Effectiveness of Gain-Framed 
and Loss-Framed Persuasive Appeals Concerning Obesity-Related Behaviors: Meta-analytic 
Evidence and Implications, in Batra, Keller, and Strecher, eds, Leveraging Consumer Psychology 
171, 178–81 (cited in note 16). 
  21  See Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of 
Social Judgment 57–58 (Prentice-Hall 1980). For a discussion of graphic health warnings on 
cigarette packages in a rule finalized by the Food and Drug Administration, see text 
accompanying notes 123–26. 
  22  See Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference at 43–62 (cited in note 21); Richard E. Nisbett, 
et al, Popular Induction: Information Is Not Necessarily Informative, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul 
Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 101, 112 
(Cambridge 1982).  
  23  For a discussion of some of the foundational issues, see Pedro Bordalo, Nicola 
Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer, Salience Theory of Choice under Risk *1 (NBER Working Paper 
No 16387, Sep 2010), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1683137 
(visited Apr 4, 2011).  
  24  See Victor Stango and Jonathan Zinman, Limited and Varying Consumer Attention: 
Evidence from Shocks to the Salience of Bank Overdraft Fees *27–28 (Fed Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia Working Paper No 11-17, Apr 2011), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1817916 (visited Aug 24, 2011). 
  25  Id at *25, 27. 2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1355 
and the take-up of health insurance; one reason is that being surveyed 
increases the salience of the action in question.
26 
A more general point is that many costs (or benefits) are less 
salient than purchase prices; they are “shrouded attributes” to which 
some consumers do not pay much attention. Such “add-on” costs may 
matter a great deal in practice but receive little consideration in 
advance, simply because they are not salient.
27 An absence of attention 
to energy costs, which may be “shrouded” for some consumers, has 
potential implications for regulatory policy, including information 
provision.
28 A field experiment found that clear textual reminders that 
loan payments are due had a significant effect on payments—indeed, 
the same effect as an economic incentive in the form of a 25 percent 
decrease in interest payments.
29  
c)  People often display loss aversion; they may well dislike losses 
more than they like corresponding gains.
30 Whether a change counts as 
a loss or a gain depends on the reference point, which can be affected 
by policy decisions, and which is often the status quo. In part for this 
reason, the initial allocation of a legal entitlement can affect people’s 
valuations. Those who have the initial allocation may value a good 
more than they would if the allocation were originally elsewhere, thus 
showing an endowment effect.
31 
                                                                                                                         
  26  See Alix Peterson Zwane, et al, Being Surveyed Can Change Later Behavior and Related 
Parameter Estimates, 108 Proceedings Natl Acad Sci 1821, 1825–26 (2011). 
  27  See Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and 
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q J Econ 505, 511 (2006). 
  28  See Hunt Allcott, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Dmitry Taubinsky, Externalizing the 
Internality *5–6 (unpublished manuscript, July 2011), online at http://web.mit.edu/allcott/www 
/AMT%202011%20-%20Externalizing%20the%20Internality.pdf (visited Aug 24, 2011).  
  29  See generally Ximena Cadena and Antoinette Schoar, Remembering to Pay? Reminders 
vs. Financial Incentives for Loan Payments (NBER Working Paper No 17020, May 2011), online 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1833157 (visited Aug 24, 2011). 
  30  See Richard H. Thaler, Daniel Kahneman, and Jack L. Knetsch, Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in Richard H. Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics 167, 
169 (Russell Sage 1991); A. Peter McGraw, et al, Comparing Gains and Losses, 21 Psych Sci 1438, 
1444 (2010). Vivid evidence of loss aversion can be found in David Card and Gordon B. Dahl, 
Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior, 
126  Q J Econ 103, 105–06, 130–35 (2011) (finding an increase in domestic violence after a 
favored team suffers from an upset loss in football). 
  31  See Thaler, Kahneman, and Knetsch, Experimental Tests at 167 (cited in note 30). A 
detailed literature discusses the mechanisms behind the endowment effect and the circumstances 
in which it will be found. See, for example, Keith M. Marzilli Ericson and Andreas Fuster, 
Expectations as Endowments: Evidence on Reference-Dependent Preferences from Exchange and 
Valuation Experiments *23 (unpublished manuscript, May 2010), online at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1505121 (visited Apr 4, 2011). For a recent finding of loss aversion in an interesting 
setting, see Devin G. Pope and Maurice E. Schweitzer, Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent 
Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes, 101 Am Econ Rev 129, 132 (2011) 
(concluding that loss aversion costs the top twenty golfers in the world $640,000 a year on 
average).  1356  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
3. Social influences. 
a) In multiple domains, individual behavior is influenced by the 
perceived behavior of other people.
32 With respect to obesity, proper 
exercise, alcohol consumption, smoking, becoming vaccinated, and 
much more, the perceived decisions of others can have a significant 
influence on individual behavior and choice.
33 The behavior of peers 
has been found to have a major impact on risky behavior among 
adolescents, including tobacco smoking, marijuana use, and truancy.
34 
In particular, food consumption is affected by the food 
consumption of others, and indeed the body type of others in the 
relevant group has been found to affect people’s food choices, with a 
greater effect from those who are thin than from those who are 
heavy.
35 Perception of the norm in the pertinent community can affect 
                                                                                                                         
  32  See David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and 
Informational Cascades, in Mariano Tommasi and Kathryn Ierulli, eds, The New Economics of 
Human Behavior 188, 189 (Cambridge 1995) (“When people can observe one another’s 
behavior, they very often end up making the same choices.”); Esther Duflo and Emmanuel Saez, 
The Role of Information and Social Interactions in Retirement Plan Decisions: Evidence from a 
Randomized Experiment, 118 Q J Econ 815, 839 (2003) (discussing retirement plan decisions); 
Hunt Allcott, Social Norms and Energy Conservation *5 (MIT Center for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research Working Paper No 09-014, Oct 2009), online at 
http://web.mit.edu/allcott/www/Allcott%202010%20-%20Social%20Norms%20and%20Energy 
%20Conservation.pdf (visited Apr 5, 2011) (discussing energy conservation); Scott E. Carrell, 
Mark Hoekstra, and James E. West, Is Poor Fitness Contagious? Evidence from Randomly 
Assigned Friends *17 (NBER Working Paper No 16518, Nov 2010), online at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16518 (visited Apr 5, 2011) (concluding that peers influence 
personal fitness and the likelihood of failing fitness requirements); Banerjee and Duflo, Poor 
Economics at 68 (cited in note 3) (noting that “knowledge travels” and that friends and 
neighbors of those given a free bed net “were also more likely to buy a net themselves”). For a 
treatment with a wide range of examples, see generally Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. 
Fowler,  Connected: The Surprising Power of Our Social Networks and How They Shape Our 
Lives (Little, Brown 2009). 
  33 See  Hirshleifer,  The Blind Leading the Blind at 188–89 (cited in note 32) (attributing 
patterns of alcohol, cigarette, and illegal drug consumption to “localized conformity”). For a 
finding of significant effects from social comparison on water consumption, see generally Paul J. 
Ferraro and Michael K. Price, Using Non-pecuniary Strategies to Influence Behavior: Evidence 
from a Large-Scale Field Experiment (NBER Working Paper No 17189, July 2011), online at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17189.pdf (visited Aug 24, 2011). 
  34  See David Card and Laura Giuliano, Peer Effects and Multiple Equilibria in the Risky 
Behavior of Friends *4 (NBER Working Paper No 17088, May 2011), online at http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w17088.pdf (visited Aug 24, 2011); Alberto Bisin, Andrea Moro, and 
Giorgio Topa, The Empirical Content of Models with Multiple Equilibria in Economies with 
Social Interactions *52–54 (NBER Working Paper No 17196, June 2011), online at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/topa/multimay11b.pdf (visited Sept 25, 2011) 
(finding strong effects of social interactions on smoking). 
  35  See Brent McFerran, et al, How the Body Type of Others Impacts Our Food 
Consumption, in Batra, Keller, and Strecher, eds, Leveraging Consumer Psychology 151, 161–63 
(cited in note 16).  2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1357 
risk taking, safety, and health.
36 The norm conveys significant 
information about what ought to be done. For that reason, people may 
follow the apparent beliefs and behavior of relevant others, sometimes 
creating informational cascades.
37 In addition, people care about their 
reputations, and for that reason, they may be influenced by others so 
as not to incur their disapproval.
38  
In some contexts, social norms can help create a phenomenon of 
compliance without enforcement—as, for example, when people 
comply with laws forbidding indoor smoking or requiring the buckling 
of seat belts, in part because of social norms or the expressive function 
of those laws.
39 These points bear on the value and importance, in 
many domains, of private–public partnerships. 
b) In part because of social influences, people are more likely to 
cooperate with one another, and to contribute to the solution of collective 
action problems, than standard economic theory predicts.
40 People’s 
willingness to cooperate is partly a product of an independent 
commitment to fairness; it is partly a product of a belief that others will 
see and punish a failure to cooperate or to act fairly. Norms of 
reciprocity can be exceedingly important. In many contexts, the result is 
                                                                                                                         
  36  See Department of Agriculture and Department of Health and Human Services, Dietary 
Guidelines for Americans 2010 56, online at http://www.health.gov/dietaryguidelines 
/dga2010/DietaryGuidelines2010.pdf (visited Apr 5, 2011) (emphasizing the relevance of “social 
and cultural norms and values” for “nutrition and physical activity”). 
  37 See  Hirshleifer,  The Blind Leading the Blind at 191 (cited in note 32) (“[A]n 
informational cascade occurs when the information implicit in predecessors’ actions—or 
resulting payoffs—is so conclusive that a rational follower will unconditionally imitate them, 
without regard to information from other sources.”). See also Duflo and Saez, 118 Q J Econ 
at  819 (cited in note 32) (suggesting that social influences affect participation in retirement 
plans). For an interesting application, see Brian Knight and Nathan Schiff, Momentum and Social 
Learning in Presidential Primaries *13–16 (NBER Working Paper No 13637, Nov 2010), online at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13637.pdf?new_window=1 (visited Apr 29, 2011) (exploring social 
learning in the context of presidential primaries and finding that early voters have a 
disproportionate influence in the selection of candidates compared to late voters). 
  38 See  Timur  Kuran,  Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference 
Falsification 35–38 (Harvard 1997). 
  39  See Robert A. Kagan and Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance without 
Enforcement, in Robert L. Rabin and Stephen D. Sugarman, eds, Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, 
and Culture 69, 72 (Oxford 1993) (finding that a source of compliance with a law prohibiting 
smoking indoors was public support); Tho Bella Dinh-Zarr, et al, Reviews of Evidence Regarding 
Interventions to Increase the Use of Safety Belts, 21 Am J Prev Med 48, 49 (2001) (suggesting that 
efforts to enforce safety belt use are effective in large part because they help to make safety belt 
use a social norm); Maggie Wittlin, Note, Buckling under Pressure: An Empirical Test of the 
Expressive Effects of Law, 28 Yale J Reg 419, 443–47 (2011) (finding that laws requiring seatbelt 
use have significant effects even controlling for citations issued), online at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1759993 (visited Apr 5, 2011). 
  40  See Colin F. Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction 46 
(Princeton 2003). 1358  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
a situation in which people cooperate on the assumption that others are 
cooperating as well and might punish those who fail to do so.
41 
4. Difficulties in assessing probability. 
a) In some domains, people show unrealistic optimism.
42 The 
“above average” effect is common.
43 Many people believe that they 
are less likely than others to suffer from various misfortunes, including 
automobile accidents and adverse health outcomes. One study found 
that while smokers do not underestimate the statistical risks faced by 
the population of smokers, they nonetheless believe that their 
personal risk is less than that of the average nonsmoker.
44 Unrealistic 
optimism is associated with the “good news–bad news effect,” through 
which people give more weight to good news than to bad news. This 
finding is related to confirmation bias, which occurs when people give 
special weight to information that confirms their antecedent beliefs.
45 
b) People often use heuristics, or mental shortcuts, when assessing 
risks.
46 For example, judgments about probability are often affected by 
whether a recent event comes readily to mind.
47 If an event is 
cognitively “available,” people might well overestimate the risk. If an 
event is not cognitively available, people might well underestimate the 
risk.
48 In short, “availability bias” can lead to inaccurate judgments 
about the probability of undesirable outcomes.
49  
                                                                                                                         
  41  See James Habyarimana, et al, Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective 
Action 108–09 (Russell Sage 2009); Herbert Gintis, et al, Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: 
Origins, Evidence, and Consequences, in Herbert Gintis, et al, eds, Moral Sentiments and Material 
Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life 3, 8 (MIT 2005). 
  42  See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 
51 Vand L Rev 1653, 1659 (1998). See generally Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the 
Irrationally Positive Brain (Knopf 2011). 
  43 See  Neil  D.  Weinstein,  Unrealistic Optimism about Susceptibility to Health Problems: 
Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J Behav Med 481, 494 (1987).  
  44 See  Paul  Slovic,  Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 Duke L J 1133, 1136–37 (1998). 
  45  See David Eil and Justin M. Rao, The Good News–Bad News Effect: Asymmetrical 
Processing of Objective Information about Yourself, 3 Am Econ J: Microecon 114, 117 (2011), 
online at http://ices.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/The-Good-News-Bad-News-Effect-
Asymmetric-Processing-of-Objective-Information-about-Yourself-by-Rao-and-Eil.pdf (visited 
Apr 5, 2011). 
  46  See generally Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: 
Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, eds, Heuristics 
and Biases 49 (cited in note 4). 
  47  See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency 
and Probability, 5 Cog Psych 207, 221 (1973).  
  48 See  Elke  U.  Weber,  Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of Long-Term 
Risk: Why Global Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 Climatic Change 103, 107–08 (2006). 
  49  See Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstein, Cognitive Processes and 
Societal Risk Taking, in Paul Slovic, ed, The Perception of Risk 32, 37–38 (Earthscan 2000); 
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c) People sometimes do not make judgments on the basis of 
expected value, and they may neglect or disregard the issue of 
probability, especially when strong emotions are triggered.
50 When 
emotions are strongly felt, people may focus on the outcome and not 
on the probability that it will occur.
51 This point obviously bears on 
reactions to extreme events of various sorts. Prospect theory, which 
does not depend on emotions at all, suggests that for low and 
moderate changes, people may be risk averse with respect to gains but 
risk seeking with respect to losses; for very large changes, people may 
be risk seeking with respect to gains but risk averse for losses.
52 
These various findings are hardly inconsistent with the 
conventional economic emphasis on the importance of material 
incentives. Actual and perceived costs and benefits certainly matter. 
When the price of a product rises, or when it becomes clear that use of 
a product imposes serious health risks, the demand for the product is 
likely to fall (at least, and this is a significant qualification, if these 
effects are salient
53). But apart from strictly material incentives of this 
kind, evidence suggests the independent importance of (1) the social 
environment and (2) prevailing social norms. If, for example, healthy 
foods are prominent and easily accessible, people are more likely to 
choose them;
54 one study finds an 8 to 16 percent decrease in intake if 
                                                                                                                         
Laurette Dubé-Rioux and J. Edward Russo, An Availability Bias in Professional Judgment, 1 J 
Behav Dec Making 223, 234 (1988).  
  50  See George F. Loewenstein, et al, Risk as Feelings, 127 Psych Bull 267, 280 (2001). 
  51  See Yuval Rottenstreich and Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: 
On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 Psych Sci 185, 185 (2001). For a demonstration that 
probability is often neglected with respect to things, but not with respect to money (without, 
however, emphasizing the role of emotions), see A. Peter McGraw, Eldar Shafir, and Alexander 
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56 Mgmt Sci 816, 827 (2010). For a discussion of emotions and risk, see generally Paul Slovic, ed, 
The Feeling of Risk: New Perspectives on Risk Perception (Earthscan 2010). 
  52  See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263, 268–69 (1979). 
  53  See Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan, Policy and Choice at 126 (cited in note 2) (“A 
corrective tax on gasoline that individuals do not perceive or understand will not be effective in 
reducing carbon emissions.”). 
  54  For a vivid presentation, see Brian Wansink, David R. Just, and Joe McKendry, Lunch 
Line Redesign, NY Times A35 (Oct 21, 2010), and in particular this suggestion: 
A smarter lunchroom wouldn’t be draconian. Rather, it would nudge students toward 
making better choices on their own by changing the way their options are presented. One 
school we have observed in upstate New York, for instance, tripled the number of salads 
students bought simply by moving the salad bar away from the wall and placing it in front 
of the cash registers. 
For related evidence, see generally Anne Thorndike, et al, A 2-Phase Labeling and Choice 
Architecture Intervention to Improve Healthy Food and Vending Choices (unpublished 
manuscript, 2011) (on file with author) (finding that a color-coded labeling intervention 
increased healthy choices and that increased visibility and convenience of healthy choices also 
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food is made slightly more difficult to reach (as, for example, by 
varying its proximity by ten inches or altering the serving utensil).
55 
The problem of childhood obesity is, at least in part, a product of the 
easy availability of unhealthy foods.
56 The same point bears on 
smoking and alcohol abuse. 
Here is another way to put the point. The existing social 
environment and current social norms provide the backdrop for many 
choices and can greatly affect outcomes. Consumer products are 
accompanied by default rules of various sorts; consider, for example, 
rental car and cell phone agreements, where it is possible to opt in or 
to opt out of a range of features, and where the default rule may 
greatly matter. With respect to water quality, air quality, sewage 
treatment, immunization, and health care, the social environment 
provides relevant background, which is often taken for granted, and 
which need not, for many people much of the time, become a serious 
source of deliberation and choice. For people who are well-off, the 
relevant background, much of which has not been an object of 
reflection on their part, is highly desirable and may be taken for 
granted without causing harm. But for some people, the background is 
not so benign, and reflection and choice are required. 
The broader point is that when some aspect of the background is 
changed—when, for example, a new default rule is provided for 
savings plans, or when good choices become simpler and easier to 
make—significant changes may occur.
57 And when some people, cities, 
and states do well and others poorly, the reason will sometimes have a 
great deal to do with certain aspects of the relevant background, 
which allow those who do well to take for granted and not even to 
think about important matters, whereas those who do poorly must 
focus on and attempt to fix key features of the relevant background.
58  
                                                                                                                         
  55  See Paul Rozin, et al, Nudge to Nobesity I: Minor Changes in Accessibility Decrease Food 
Intake, 6 Judgment & Dec Making 323, 329 (2011). 
  56  See Janet Currie, et al, The Effect of Fast Food Restaurants on Obesity and Weight Gain, 
2 Am Econ J: Econ Pol 32, 60 (2010); Department of Agriculture and Department of Health and 
Human Services, Dietary Guidelines for Americans 2010 at 55–56 (cited in note 36) 
(emphasizing that “[p]eople regularly make decisions about food and physical activity in a 
variety of community settings” that “play an integral role in affecting individuals’ and families’ 
food and physical activity choices through their organizational environments and policies”). 
  57  See Banerjee and Duflo, Poor Economics at 15 (cited in note 3). 
  58  See id at 68–69. See also id at 269:  
The poor bear responsibility for too many aspects of their lives. The richer you are, the 
more the “right” decisions are made for you. The poor have no piped water, and therefore 
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In many contexts, seemingly modest differences in the social 
environment exert a large influence on outcomes even if they do not 
greatly alter material incentives.
59 Social norms have an independent 
effect: whether people smoke cigarettes, exercise, buckle their seat 
belts, text while driving, eat healthy foods, or enroll in a retirement 
plan is significantly influenced by the perceived norm within the 
relevant group.
60 This point suggests the potential importance of 
leadership in the private sector and of private–public partnerships in 
these and other domains.  
B. Concerns 
1. Are predictions possible?  
It is tempting to respond that these diverse findings might point 
in different directions, even for the same subpopulation faced with the 
same problem, and hence that clear predictions cannot be made in 
particular cases. For example, will people save too little or too much? 
Will they take optimal, excessive, or insufficient precautions against 
the risks associated with poor diet?  
By itself and in the abstract, an understanding of loss aversion, 
the availability heuristic, and social influences does not produce clear 
answers. Such an understanding could, on plausible assumptions, 
suggest that people will save too much or take excessive precautions, 
or, on other plausible assumptions, suggest the opposite conclusions. 
And it may well be the case that loss aversion, unrealistic optimism, 
the availability heuristic, and social influences are simultaneously at 
work and point in different directions, making predictions difficult or 
impossible. For example, unrealistic optimism may lead people to 
underestimate certain risks, while the availability heuristic may lead 
people to overestimate the same risks. Although procrastination will 
cause delay, loss aversion may lead people to act promptly. 
It is true that if these findings are taken as a whole and in the 
abstract, they will not lead to a clear or unique prediction about 
behavior. Particular situations must be investigated in detail in order 
to understand likely outcomes. We will often be able to identify 
                                                                                                                         
  59  For a discussion of many illustrations in the context of food choices, see Brian Wansink, 
Mindless Eating: Why We Eat More Than We Think 10 (Bantam 2006). For discussions and many 
illustrations in the context of development, see generally Banerjee and Duflo, Poor Economics 
(cited in note 3); Dean Karlan and Jacob Appel, More Than Good Intentions: How a New 
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mechanisms rather than law-like generalizations.
61 For the purposes of 
this Essay, it is not necessary to engage these questions in detail. Low-
cost regulatory policies, such as disclosure and simplification, may be 
justified even if we do not have a clear understanding, in the abstract, 
of whether the relevant behavior mostly a product of loss aversion or 
social influences. Of course it is also true that the design of a 
disclosure policy should be based on an understanding of how people 
process information, and that a sensible approach to simplification 
will require understandings of whether and why complexity can create 
problems and of what kinds of simplification can eliminate those 
problems. 
2. Markets versus government.  
An understanding of the findings outlined above does not, by 
itself, demonstrate that “more” regulation would be desirable.
62 To be 
sure, some of the relevant findings supplement the standard accounts 
of market failures, suggesting that in some settings, markets may fail, 
in the sense that they may not promote social welfare, even in the 
presence of perfect competition and full information.
63 If, for example, 
people focus on short-term costs and neglect long-term benefits, it is 
possible that disclosure policies that specifically emphasize the long-
term, or perhaps even  regulatory requirements (involving, for 
example, energy efficiency), may be justified. It is also possible to 
identify “internalities”—problems of self-control and errors in 
judgments that produce within-person harms, as, for example, when 
smoking behavior leads to serious risks because of the victory of 
short-term considerations over the longer view.
64 
But even if the standard accounts of potential market failures are 
supplemented, it does not necessarily follow that more regulation is 
justified. Perhaps reliance on the private sector is best. Perhaps markets 
                                                                                                                         
  61  See Jon Elster, A Plea for Mechanism, in Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg, eds, 
Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory 45, 47–49 (Cambridge 1998) 
(distinguishing explanatory mechanisms from “scientific laws” and noting that a mechanism 
provides an explanation that is “more general than the phenomenon that it subsumes”); Jon 
Elster,  Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences 27–31 
(Cambridge 2007). 
  62  See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U Chi L Rev 133, 133–34 (2006). 
  63  See Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan, Policy and Choice at 40–48, 62–66 (cited in 
note 2) (discussing the implications of behavioral findings for public finance and offering a range 
of explorations of how standard accounts must be supplemented). 
  64  See id at 120–22. For a related discussion, seeing an “internality” as stemming from 
inattention, see Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky, Externalizing the Internality at *5–6 (cited 
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will eventually address the problem better than regulators would, and 
for multiple reasons, the cure might be worse than the disease.
65  
Indeed, some of the findings might argue in favor of less rather 
than more regulation. When, for example, people are able to solve 
collective action problems on their own, government is not needed.
66 
In certain circumstances, automatic enrollment is preferable to 
mandates and bans. Moreover, market forces can provide a great deal 
of help in the face of human error. For example, the private sector has 
relied increasingly on automatic enrollment in savings plans,
67 and 
countless companies attempt to promote better diet and more 
exercise (perhaps expecting to obtain more customers as a result).  
It should not be necessary to acknowledge that public officials 
are subject to error as well. Indeed, errors may result from one or 
more of the findings traced above; officials are human and may also 
err. The dynamics of the political process may or may not lead in the 
right direction. It would be absurd to say that empirically informed 
regulation is more aggressive than regulation that is not so informed, 
or that an understanding of recent empirical findings calls for more 
regulation rather than less. The argument is instead that such an 
understanding can help to inform the design of regulatory programs. 
For example, many such programs require disclosure, and such 
disclosure should be designed so as to be helpful and informative 
rather than unintelligible or meaningless. When procrastination and 
inertia are causing harm, simplification may produce unexpectedly 
large benefits, and officials should avoid unnecessary complexity. 
Private–public partnerships, maintaining freedom of choice, may be 
far better than top–down dictation by government. 
3. Incomplete information.  
Although the empirical literature is large and growing, continuing 
research is highly desirable. Executive Order 13563 explicitly 
emphasizes the importance of efforts to “measure, and seek to 
improve, the actual results of regulatory requirements.”
68 It also calls 
for “the periodic review of existing significant regulations” to 
                                                                                                                         
  65  See Glaeser, 73 U Chi L Rev at 150–56 (cited in note 62) (outlining arguments against 
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  68  76 Fed Reg at 3821 (cited in note 1). See also Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of 
Persistent Regulatory Experimentation and Evaluation, in David Moss and John Cisternino, eds, 
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ascertain those actual results.
69 With respect to retrospective review, 
consider the suggestion that the “single greatest problem with the 
current system is that most regulations are subject to a cost–benefit 
analysis only in advance of their implementation. This is the point 
when the least is known and any analysis must rest on many 
unverifiable and potentially controversial assumptions.”
70 On this view, 
it is important to consider a series of reforms designed to “instill a 
culture of experimentation and evaluation.”
71 
With respect to the particular concerns, it would be valuable to 
have a better understanding of how the relevant findings apply within 
heterogeneous groups; the findings are far from uniform within the 
population, and for purposes of policy, heterogeneity may matter.
72 It 
would also be valuable to have a better understanding of actual 
conduct within diverse settings—for example, the decision whether to 
purchase fuel-efficient cars and appliances in the face of short-term 
costs and long-term benefits. We have good reason to believe that 
some people do not buy energy-efficient products even when it would 
be in their economic interest to do so,
73 but the conceptual and 
empirical issues are complex and have not been fully sorted out. 
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online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351186 (visited Sept 25, 2011). 
  73 See Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed Reg 25324-01 (2010). As stated in the preamble to this rule,  
The central conundrum has been referred to as the Energy Paradox in this setting (and in 
several others). In short, the problem is that consumers appear not to purchase products 
that are in their economic self-interest. There are strong theoretical reasons why this might 
be so: 
•  Consumers might be myopic and hence undervalue the long-term. 
•  Consumers might lack information or a full appreciation of information even when it is 
presented. 
•  Consumers might be especially averse to the short-term losses associated with the 
higher prices of energy efficient products relative to the uncertain future fuel savings, 
even if the expected present value of those fuel savings exceeds the cost (the behavioral 
phenomenon of “loss aversion”). 
•  Even if consumers have relevant knowledge, the benefits of energy-efficient vehicles 
might not be sufficiently salient to them at the time of purchase, and the lack of salience 
might lead consumers to neglect an attribute that it would be in their economic interest 
to consider. 
•  In the case of vehicle fuel efficiency and perhaps as a result of one or more of the 
foregoing factors, consumers may have relatively few choices to purchase vehicles with 
greater fuel economy once other characteristics, such as vehicle class, are chosen. 
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But even at this stage, existing research offers helpful lessons for 
regulatory policy.
74 Particular attention has been devoted to the 
possible development of minimally burdensome, low-cost, choice-
preserving approaches, such as automatic enrollment and disclosure 
requirements, that promote regulatory goals while maintaining 
individual authority, ownership, and control.
75 Empirically informed 
approaches, taking account of recent work in the social sciences 
(including behavioral economics), can be considered in many domains, 
including financial regulation, public health, labor, environmental 
protection, energy use, motor vehicle safety, and consumer 
protection.
76  
Relevant research suggests that four such approaches have 
particular promise: (1) using disclosure as a regulatory tool, especially 
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healthier food options without harming those who will choose healthy options on their own). 
  75  See, for example, Colin Camerer, et al, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U Pa L Rev 1211, 1227–36 (2003). 
For a discussion of potential applications of behavioral economics to financial savings, see 
William G. Gale, et al, Introduction, in William G. Gale, et al, eds, Automatic: Changing the Way 
America Saves 1, 3–5 (Brookings 2009). For a related discussion of energy efficiency, see 
generally Hunt Allcott and Sendhil Mullainathan, Behavioral Science and Energy Policy, 
327 Sci 1204 (2010). 
  76  See Sendhil Mullainathan, Psychology and Development Economics, in Diamond and 
Vartiainen, eds, Behavioral Economics and Its Applications 85, 95–97 (cited in note 2); Truman F. 
Bewley, Fairness, Reciprocity, and Wage Rigidity, in Diamond and Vartiainen, eds, Behavioral 
Economics and Its Applications 157, 157–59 (cited in note 2); Richard G. Frank, Behavioral 
Economics and Health Economics, in Diamond and Vartiainen, eds, Behavioral Economics and 
Its Applications 195, 195–96 (cited in note 2); Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir, Savings 
Policy and Decisionmaking in Low-Income Households, in Rebecca M. Blank and Michael S. 
Barr, eds, Insufficient Funds: Savings, Assets, Credit, and Banking among Low-Income 
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if disclosure policies are designed with an appreciation of how people 
process information; (2) simplifying and easing choices through 
appropriate default rules, reduction of complexity and paperwork 
requirements, and related strategies; (3) increasing the salience of 
certain factors or variables; and (4) promoting social norms through 
private–public partnerships and other approaches that operate in the 
service of agreed-upon public goals. Empirically informed approaches 
of this kind are already in place, including a number of recent 
initiatives. 
II.  DISCLOSURE AS A REGULATORY TOOL 
This Part explores the uses of disclosure as a regulatory tool. It is 
important to distinguish between summary disclosure, often provided at 
the point of purchase, and full disclosure, typically provided on the 
Internet. A central point is that disclosure policies should be based on 
an understanding of how people process information. For example, 
summary disclosure will not be helpful if it is ambiguous or unduly 
complex, or if it uses a scale that is not meaningful to consumers. A 
general goal should be to promote empirical testing, including 
randomized experiments, of disclosure policies to learn whether they 
will work or are actually working.
77 Such testing may well include 
retrospective analysis of the kind promoted by Executive Order 13563. 
A. Actually Informing Choice 
1. Examples.  
Many statutory programs recognize that information disclosure 
can be a useful regulatory tool, replacing or complementing other 
approaches.
78 Traditionally, information production and disclosure 
have been considered an appropriate regulatory response to market 
failures that stem from asymmetric or inadequate information.
79 
Properly designed disclosure requirements can significantly improve 
the operation of markets, leading consumers to make more informed 
decisions.
80 Central examples include legislative efforts to require 
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  78  See Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and 
Promise of Transparency 5–6 (Cambridge 2007); Brian Wansink and Matthew M. Cheney, 
Leveraging FDA Health Claims, 39 J Consumer Aff 386, 393, 396 (2005). 
  79  See Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, and Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of 
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  80 See Fung, Graham, and Weil, Full Disclosure at 6 (cited in note 78); Yong H. Chu, et al, 
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disclosure of the risks associated with smoking, of potential savings 
from energy efficiency, and of information that bears on health.  
a) Credit cards. The Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, 
and Disclosure Act of 2009
81 (Credit CARD Act) is designed in large 
part to ensure that credit card users are adequately informed and that 
they receive advance notice of changes in terms. Specifically, and 
among other things, the Act requires  clear and conspicuous disclosure 
of annual percentage rates (APR) and finance charges,
82 prohibits an 
increase in APR without forty-five days notice,
83 prohibits the 
retroactive application of rate increases to existing balances,
84 and 
requires clear notice of the consumer’s right to cancel the credit card 
when the APR is raised.
85  
The Act also requires a number of electronic disclosures of the 
terms of credit card agreements. Specifically, it requires that 
(1)  “[e]ach creditor shall establish and maintain an Internet site on 
which the creditor shall post the written agreement between the 
creditor and the consumer for each credit card account under an 
open-end consumer credit plan”; (2) “[e]ach creditor shall provide to 
the [Federal Reserve] Board, in electronic format, the consumer credit 
card agreements that it publishes on its Internet site”; and (3) the 
“Board shall establish and maintain on its publicly available Internet 
site a central repository of the consumer credit card agreements 
received from creditors pursuant to this subsection, and such 
agreements shall be easily accessible and retrievable by the public.”
86  
b) Tires. The Department of Transportation has been directed to 
require tire manufacturers to label their replacement tires for fuel 
efficiency, safety, and durability.
87 Such a label is intended to promote 
informed choices on the part of consumers.  
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disclosure, including disclosure of their own past choices, see Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator, 
OIRA, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Informing 
Consumers through Smart Disclosure (Sept 8, 2011), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites 
/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/informing-consumers-through-smart-disclosure.pdf 
(visited Sept 27, 2011). 
  81  Pub L No 111-24, 123 Stat 1734, codified in various sections of Titles 15 and 16. 
  82  See Credit CARD Act § 204, 15 USC 1632(d). 
  83  See Credit CARD Act § 101(a), 15 USC § 1637(i)(1). 
  84  See Credit CARD Act § 101(b), 15 USC § 1666i-1(a). 
  85  See Credit CARD Act § 102(a), 15 USC § 1637(k).  
  86  See Credit CARD Act § 203, 15 USC § 1632. 
  87  See 49 USC § 32304A (requiring a “national tire fuel efficiency consumer information 
program . . . to educate consumers about the effect of tires on automobile fuel efficiency, safety, 
and durability” and authorizing the Department of Transportation to require information at the 
point of sale and via the Internet). 1368  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
c) Nutrition. In the domain of nutrition, many disclosure 
requirements are in place. To take just one example, a final rule has 
been issued by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), requiring 
provision of nutritional information to consumers with respect to 
meat and poultry products. Nutrition facts panels must be provided on 
the labels of such products. Under the rule, the panels must contain 
information with respect to calories and both total and saturated fats.
88 
The rule clearly recognizes the potential importance of framing. 
If a product lists a percentage statement such as “80% lean,” it must 
also list its fat percentage.
89 This requirement should avoid the 
confusion that can result from selective framing; a statement that a 
product is 80 percent lean, standing by itself, makes leanness salient, 
and may therefore be insufficiently informative. 
d) Health care. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
of 2010
90 (Affordable Care Act) contains a large number of disclosure 
requirements designed to promote accountability and informed choice 
with respect to health care.
91 Indeed, the Affordable Care Act is, in 
part, a series of disclosure requirements. For example, § 1103 of the 
Act calls for disclosure of “[i]mmediate information that allows 
consumers to identify affordable coverage options.”
92 It requires the 
establishment of an Internet portal to enable people to find affordable 
coverage options,
93 including information about eligibility, availability, 
premium rates, cost sharing, and the percentage of total premium 
revenues spent on health care, rather than administrative expenses.
94  
Pursuant to the Act, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) has also proposed a rule to require insurance 
companies to provide clear summaries of relevant information to 
prospective customers.
95 The information includes the annual premium, 
                                                                                                                         
  88  See 9 CFR § 317.309. 
  89 See  9  CFR  § 317.309. 
  90  Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119, codified in various sections of Title 42. 
  91  For one example, see http://www.healthcare.gov (visited Jan 16, 2011), designed to 
increase transparency and to promote comparison shopping. See also Affordable Care Act 
§ 6401(a), 42 USC § 1395cc(j). 
  92  Affordable Care Act § 1103, 42 USC § 18003. 
  93  The statute provides: “Not later than July 1, 2010, the Secretary, in consultation with the 
States, shall establish a mechanism, including an Internet website, through which a resident of 
any State may identify affordable health insurance coverage options in that State.” Affordable 
Care Act § 1103(a)(1), 42 USC § 18003(a)(1). 
  94  Affordable Care Act § 1103(b)(1), 42 USC § 18003(b)(1). 
  95  Department of Health and Human Services, Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act; Exchange Function in the Individual Market: Eligibility Determinations; Exchange 
Standards for Employers, 76 Fed Reg 51202-01, 51210 (2011). 2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1369 
the annual deductible, the services that are not covered, and the costs of 
going to an out-of-network provider.
96  
Under another provision of the Act, certain chain restaurants are 
required to disclose calorie information on their menus. Such 
restaurants are also required to provide in written form (available to 
customers upon request) additional nutritional information involving 
amounts of fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, sodium, total carbohydrates, 
complex carbohydrates, sugars, dietary fiber, and protein.
97   
It should be clear from this brief and partial survey that the range 
of recent disclosure requirements is very wide. Such approaches have 
considerable promise.
98 
2. How, not only whether.  
As social scientists have emphasized, disclosure as such may not 
be enough; it is important to consider how, not only whether, disclosure 
occurs.
99 Clarity and simplicity are often critical. In some cases, even 
accurate disclosure of information may be ineffective if the 
information is too abstract, vague, detailed, complex, poorly framed, 
or overwhelming to be useful.
100 Disclosure requirements should be 
designed for homo sapiens, not homo economicus (the agent in 
economics textbooks). In addition, emphasis on certain variables may 
attract undue attention and prove to be misleading. If disclosure 
requirements are to be helpful, they must be designed to be sensitive 
to how people actually process information.  
A good rule of thumb is that disclosure should be concrete, 
straightforward, simple, meaningful, timely, and salient. If the goal is to 
                                                                                                                         
  96  See id. See also Department of Health and Human Services, Providing Clear and 
Consistent Information to Consumers about Their Health Insurance Coverage (Aug 22, 2011), 
online at http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/labels08172011a.html (visited Aug 25, 2011); 
Department of Health and Humans Services, Sample Insurance Coverage Template, online at 
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/labels08172011b.pdf (visited Aug 25, 2011) (providing 
policy information templates).  
  97  See Affordable Care Act §  4205(b), 21 USC §  343(q)(5)(H). See also 21 USC 
§ 343(q)(1)(C)–(D). 
  98 See Fung, Graham, and Weil, Full Disclosure at 170–82 (cited in note 78); Scot Burton, et 
al, Attacking the Obesity Epidemic: The Potential Health Benefits of Providing Nutrition 
Information in Restaurants, 96 Am J Pub Health 1669, 1674 (2006). 
  99  See Riis and Ratner, Simplified Nutrition Guidelines to Fight Obesity at 334 (cited in 
note 16) (emphasizing the importance of simplicity to promote effective communication of 
health messages); Jessica Wisdom, Julie S. Downs, and George Loewenstein, Promoting Healthy 
Choices: Information versus Convenience, 2 Am Econ J: Applied Econ 164, 175–76 (2010); Julie S. 
Downs, George Loewenstein, and Jessica Wisdom, Strategies for Promoting Healthier Food 
Choices, 99 Am Econ Rev 159, 162 (2009); Wansink and Cheney, 39 J Consumer Aff at 394 (cited 
in note 78). 
  100  See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward 
a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 Baylor L Rev 139, 160–63 (2006). 1370  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
inform people about how to avoid risks or to obtain benefits, 
disclosure should avoid abstract statements (promoting, for example, 
“healthy eating” or “good diet”) and instead clearly identify the steps 
that might be taken to obtain the relevant goal (by specifying, for 
example, what actions parents might take to reduce the risk of 
childhood obesity). Health claims in particular have been found more 
likely to succeed if they are targeted at a problem that is both 
personally relevant and vivid, if they emphasize quantitative health 
benefits, and if they are aimed at demographic groups that are 
particularly at risk, such as young children or pregnant women.
101  
In 2010, HHS emphasized the importance of clarity and salience 
in connection with its interim final rule entitled “Health Care Reform 
Insurance Web Portal Requirements,” which “adopts the categories of 
information that will be collected and displayed as Web portal 
content, and the data we will require from issuers and request from 
States, associations, and high-risk pools in order to create this 
content.”
102 The preamble to the interim final rule is empirically 
informed in the sense that it is directly responsive to how people 
process information:  
In implementing these requirements, we seek to develop a Web 
site (hereinafter called the Web portal) that would empower 
consumers by increasing informed choice and promoting market 
competition. To achieve these ends, we intend to provide a Web 
portal that provides information to consumers in a clear, salient, 
and easily navigated manner. We plan to minimize the use of 
technical language, jargon, or excessive complexity in order to 
promote the ability of consumers to understand the information 
and act in accordance with what they have learned. . . . [W]e plan 
to provide information, consistent with applicable laws, in a 
format that is accessible for use by members of the public, 
allowing them to download and repackage the information, 
promoting innovation and the goal of consumer choice.
103  
On June 30, 2010, HHS launched that web portal at 
http://www.healthcare.gov/.  
                                                                                                                         
  101  See Wansink and Cheney, 39 J Consumer Aff at 389, 391 (cited in note 78). 
  102  Department of Health and Human Services, Health Care Reform Insurance Web Portal 
Requirements, 75 Fed Reg 24470, 24470 (2010). 
  103  75 Fed Reg at 24471 (cited in note 102). 2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1371 
3. Testing disclosure.  
To the extent possible, agencies should study in advance the actual 
effects of alternative disclosure designs to ensure that information is 
properly presented and will actually inform consumers.
104 The “Nutrition 
Facts” labels on many food products followed such a process of advance 
study, with careful investigation of consumer responses to different 
presentations of the relevant material.
105  
Actual experience can, of course, provide valuable information. 
Because they are more likely to yield information about actual 
behavior, experimental or quasi-experimental studies are preferred to 
focus groups; randomized experiments have particular advantages.
106 
At the same time, focus groups can be useful, especially if they are 
carefully designed to assess likely behavior (rather than simply asking 
people which presentations or formats they most like). 
4. Avoiding confusion.  
If not carefully designed, disclosure requirements can produce 
ineffective, confusing, and potentially misleading messages. Empirically 
informed approaches are alert to this risk and suggest possible 
improvements.  
a) MPG and beyond. Automobile manufacturers are currently 
required to disclose the fuel economy of new vehicles as measured by 
miles per gallon (MPG).
107 This disclosure is useful for consumers and 
helps to promote informed choice. As the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has emphasized, however, MPG is a nonlinear measure 
of fuel consumption.
108 For a fixed travel distance, a change from 
twenty to twenty-five MPG produces a larger reduction in fuel costs 
than does a change from thirty to thirty-five MPG, or even from thirty 
to thirty-eight MPG. To see the point more dramatically, consider the 
fact that an increase from ten to twenty MPG produces more savings 
than an increase from twenty to forty MPG, and an increase from ten 
to eleven MPG produces savings almost as high as an increase from 
                                                                                                                         
  104 Note in this regard that under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, “[a]ny model form 
issued pursuant to this subsection shall be validated through consumer testing.” Dodd-Frank Act 
§ 1032(b)(3), 12 USC §5532(b)(3). 
  105 See  Wansink,  Mindless Eating at 8–9 (cited in note 59). 
  106  See Lynette Ryals and Hugh Wilson, Experimental Methods in Market Research: From 
Information to Insight, 47 Intl J Mkt Rsrch 347, 348, 351 (2005). 
  107  40 CFR § 600.302-08. 
  108 See Environmental Protection Agency, Fuel Economy Labeling of Motor Vehicles: 
Revisions to Improve Calculation of Fuel Economy Estimates, 74 Fed Reg 61537-01, 61542, 
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thirty-four to fifty MPG.
109 The following figure displays the 
nonlinearity of the MPG measure: 
FIGURE 1.  GALLONS OF GAS USED PER 10,000 MILES DRIVEN AS A 
FUNCTION OF FUEL EFFICIENCY OF CAR (EXPRESSED IN MPG) 
 
Source: Larrick and Soll, 320 Sci at 1593 (cited in note 109). 
Evidence suggests that many consumers do not understand this 
point and tend to interpret MPG as linear with fuel costs.
110 This error 
is likely to produce inadequately informed purchasing decisions when 
people are making comparative judgments about fuel costs. For 
example, people may well underestimate the benefits of trading a low 
MPG car for one that is even slightly more fuel efficient. By contrast, 
an alternative fuel economy metric, such as gallons per one-hundred 
miles, could be far less confusing. Such a measure is linear with fuel 
costs and hence suggests a possible way to help consumers make 
better choices.
111  
A closely related finding is that because of the MPG illusion, 
consumers tend to underestimate the fuel cost differences among low-
MPG vehicles and tend to overestimate the fuel cost differences among 
high-MPG vehicles.
112 Recognizing the imperfections and the potentially 
misleading nature of the MPG measure, the Department of 
                                                                                                                         
  109  See Richard P. Larrick and Jack B. Soll, The MPG Illusion, 320 Sci 1593, 1593 (2008). 
  110  See id at 1594. 
  111 For one view, see Carolyn Fischer, Let’s Turn CAFE Regulation on Its Head *1–2 
(Resources for the Future, Issue Brief No 09-06, May 2009), online at http://www.rff.org/RFF 
/Documents/RFF-IB-09-06.pdf (visited Jan 17, 2011). 
  112 Hunt  Allcott,  Consumers’ Perceptions and Misperceptions of Energy Costs, 101 Am Econ 
Rev 98, 102 (2011). 
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Transportation and EPA proposed in 2010 two alternative labels (see 
Figure 2) meant to provide consumers with clearer and more accurate 
information about the effects of fuel economy on fuel expenses and on 
the environment.
113  
After a period of public comment, the Department of 
Transportation and EPA ultimately chose a label that borrows from 
both proposals (see Figure 3).
114 This approach calls for disclosure of 
the factual material, including annual fuel costs, in one of its proposals 
but adds a clear statement about anticipated fuel savings (or costs) 
over a five-year period.
115 The information about annual fuel costs and 
five-year fuel savings (or costs) should simultaneously help counteract 
the MPG illusion and inform consumers of the economic effects of 
fuel economy over a relevant time period.
116 The new label includes 
information about gallons per one-hundred miles. At the same time, 
the chosen approach does not include letter grades, on the ground 
(among others) that they might be taken to suggest a governmental 
evaluation of the overall merits of cars.
117  
There is a broader lesson. With respect to energy conservation in 
general, a helpful approach is to enable consumers to know, very 
concretely, what they might gain as a result of energy-efficient choices (or 
what they might lose as a result of energy-inefficient choices). Such an 
approach might help to overcome undue focus on the short-term costs 
and benefits. See, as one example, Figure 4, which is the Federal Trade 
Commission’s energy efficiency guide, clearly identifying annual costs.  
                                                                                                                         
  113  See generally 74 Fed Reg 61537-01 (cited in note 108). 
  114 Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Transportation, Revisions and 
Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed Reg 39478, 39480 figure I-1 (2011) 
(amending 40 CFR Parts 85, 86, and 600). 
  115  Id at 39481. 
  116  Id at 39485–86, 39494–96. 
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FIGURE 2.  EPA AND DOT PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE FUEL 
ECONOMY LABELS 
 2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1375 
 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency, Fuel Economy Label, online at http://www.epa.gov 
/fueleconomy/label.htm (visited Sept 6, 2011).  
  1376  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
 
FIGURE 3.  EPA AND DOT FUEL ECONOMY AND  
ENVIRONMENT LABEL 
 
Source: 76 Fed Reg at 39480 figure I-1 (cited in note 114). 2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1377 
FIGURE 4.  FTC ENERGYGUIDE LABEL 
 
Source: FTC, Concluding Two-Year Rulemaking, FTC Announces New EnergyGuide Label 
(Aug 7, 2007), online at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/08/energy.shtm (visited Apr 5, 2011). 
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b) Plate, not pyramid. In a related vein, the USDA has abandoned 
the “Food Pyramid,” used for decades as the central icon to promote 
healthy eating.  
FIGURE 5.  USDA FOOD PYRAMID  
 
Source: US Department of Agriculture, http://www.mypyramid.gov/ (visited Aug 25, 2011). 
The Pyramid has long been criticized as insufficiently informative. 
It does not provide people with any kind of clear “path” with respect 
to healthy diet. According to one critical account, “its meaning is 
almost completely opaque. . . . To learn what the Food Pyramid has to 
say about food, you must be willing to decipher the Pyramid’s 
markings. The language and concepts here are so hopelessly 
abstracted from people’s actual experience with food . . . that the 
message  confuses  and  demoralizes . . . .”
118 In response to these 
objections, and after an extended period of deliberation, the USDA 
replaced the Pyramid with a new, simpler icon, consisting of a plate 
with clear markings for fruits, vegetables, grains, and proteins.
119  
  
                                                                                                                         
  118  See Heath and Heath, Switch at 61–62 (cited in note 13). 
  119  See Department of Agriculture, http://www.choosemyplate.gov/ (visited Aug 25, 2011). 2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1379 
FIGURE 6.  USDA FOOD PLATE 
 
Source: US Department of Agriculture, http://www.choosemyplate. 
gov/ (Aug 25, 2011). 
The plate is accompanied by straightforward guidance, including 
“make half your plate fruits and vegetables,” “drink water instead of 
sugary drinks,” and “switch to fat-free or low-fat (1%) milk.”
120 This 
approach has the key advantage of informing people what to do if 
they seek to have a healthier diet. In many contexts, the idea of “plate, 
not pyramid” might help to orient helpful disclosure policies.  
c) Plain language summaries of health insurance information. As 
noted above, HHS, implementing a provision of the Affordable Care 
Act, has proposed a rule to require insurance companies to provide 
clear, plain language summaries of relevant information to 
prospective customers.
121 The rule calls for disclosure of basic 
information, such as the annual premium, the annual deductible, a 
statement of services that are not covered, and a statement of costs for 
going to an out-of-network provider.
122 The template offers other 
information as well, some of which is presented in Figure 7:  
  
                                                                                                                         
  120 Id. 
  121  76 Fed Reg at 51210 (cited in note 95). 
  122 See id. See also Department of Health and Human Services, Providing Clear and 
Consistent Information to Consumers about Their Health Insurance Coverage (Aug 22, 2011), 
online at http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/labels08172011a.html (visited Aug 25, 2011); 
Department of Health and Human Services, Sample Insurance Coverage Template, 
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/labels08172011b.pdf (visited Aug 25, 2011) (providing 
policy information templates).  1380  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
FIGURE 7.  SAMPLE INSURANCE COVERAGE TEMPLATE 
Source: Department of Health and Human Services, Sample Insurance Coverage Template, 
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/labels08172011b.pdf (visited Aug 25, 2011). 2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1381 
d) Tobacco warnings. In some circumstances, the tendency toward 
unrealistic optimism may lead some consumers to downplay or 
neglect information about statistical risks associated with a product or 
an activity. Possible examples include smoking and distracted 
driving.
123 In such circumstances, disclosure might be designed to make 
the risks associated with the product less abstract, more vivid, and 
more salient. For example, the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act of 2009
124 (Smoking Prevention Act) requires 
graphic warnings with respect to the risks of smoking tobacco.
125 The 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has finalized such warnings, 
including vivid and even disturbing pictures of some of the adverse 
outcomes associated with smoking.
126  
5. Promoting competition. 
If disclosure requirements are straightforward and simple, they 
should facilitate comparison shopping and hence market competition. 
Drawing on social science research, the Treasury Department’s 
account of financial regulation emphasizes the value of requiring that 
“communications with the consumer are reasonable, not merely 
technically compliant and non-deceptive. Reasonableness includes 
balance in the presentation of risks and benefits, as well as clarity and 
conspicuousness in the description of significant product costs and 
risks.”
127 The department’s analysis goes on to say that one goal should 
be to 
harness technology to make disclosures more dynamic and 
adaptable to the needs of the individual consumer. . . . 
Disclosures should show consumers the consequences of their 
financial decisions. . . . [The regulator] should [ ] mandate or 
encourage calculator disclosures for mortgages to assist with 
comparison shopping. For example, a calculator that shows the 
costs of a mortgage based on the consumer’s expectations for 
how long she will stay in the home may reveal a more significant 
                                                                                                                         
  123  See Slovic, 47 Duke L J at 1136–37 (cited in note 44); Jolls, 51 Vand L Rev at 1660 (cited 
in note 42). 
  124  Pub L No 111-31, 123 Stat 1776, codified at 21 USC § 387. 
  125 See  Smoking  Prevention  Act  § 201, 15 USC § 1333(a).  
  126  For the final rule, see Food and Drug Administration, Required Warnings for Cigarette 
Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed Reg 36628 (2011). 
  127 See Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation 64 
(2009), online at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (visited 
Apr 5, 2011). 1382  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
difference between two products than appears on standard paper 
disclosures.
128 
In keeping with this theme, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau is authorized to ensure that “consumers are provided with 
timely and understandable information to make responsible decisions 
about financial transactions.”
129 The Bureau is also authorized to issue 
rules that ensure that information is “fully, accurately, and effectively 
disclosed to consumers in a manner that permits consumers to 
understand the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the product or 
service, in light of the facts and circumstances.”
130  
To accomplish this task, the Bureau is authorized to issue model 
forms with “a clear and conspicuous disclosure that, at a minimum—
(A) uses plain language comprehensible to consumers; (B) contains a 
clear format and design, such as an easily readable type font; and 
(C) succinctly explains the information that must be communicated to 
the consumer.”
131 In addition, the director of the Bureau is required to 
“establish a unit whose functions shall include researching, analyzing, 
and reporting on . . . consumer awareness, understanding, and use of 
disclosures and communications regarding consumer financial 
products or services” and “consumer behavior with respect to 
consumer financial products or services, including performance on 
mortgage loans.”
132 Note that new technologies make it relatively easy 
to inform consumers about the nature and effects of their own choices 
and usages, an approach that may be especially important when firms 
have better information than consumers do about such choices and 
usages.
133 
In the same general vein, the Department of Labor issued a final 
rule requiring disclosure to workers of relevant information in 
pension plans. The rule is designed to require clear, simple disclosure 
of information about fees and expenses and to allow meaningful 
                                                                                                                         
  128  Id at 65. On the importance of facilitating comparisons, see generally Jeff Kling, et al, 
Comparison Friction: Experimental Evidence from Medicare Drug Plans (NBER Working Paper 
No 17410, Sept 2011), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17410.pdf (visited Nov 5, 2011). 
  129  Dodd-Frank Act § 1021, 12 USC § 5511. 
  130  Dodd-Frank Act § 1032, 12 USC § 5532.  
  131  Dodd-Frank Act § 1032, 12 USC § 5532. See also Riis and Ratner, Simplified Nutrition 
Guidelines to Fight Obesity at 334 (cited in note 16) (emphasizing the importance of simplicity). 
  132  Dodd-Frank Act § 1013, 12 USC § 5493 (describing the tasks of the Bureau’s research 
unit). For a relevant discussion, see John Y. Campbell, et al, Consumer Financial Protection, 25 J 
Econ Persp 91, 92 (2011). 
  133 See Kamenica, Mullainathan, and Thaler, Helping Consumers Know Themselves at *10 
(cited in note 80). See also Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Informing Consumers 
through Smart Disclosure (cited in note 80) (emphasizing the value of providing disclosure to 
consumers of comparative information, including information about the effects of their own 
choices). 2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1383 
comparisons, in part through the use of standard methodologies in the 
calculation and disclosure of expense and return information.
134  
Yet another example is provided by a final rule of the 
Department of Education that promotes transparency and consumer 
choice with respect to for-profit education by requiring institutions to 
provide clear disclosure  of costs, debt levels, graduation rates, and 
placement rates.
135 The rule states that relevant institutions must 
disclose, among other things, the occupations that the program 
prepares students to enter, the on-time graduation rate for students 
completing the program, the tuition and fees charged to students for 
completing the program within a normal time, the placement rate for 
students completing the program, and the median loan debt incurred 
by students who completed the program. These disclosures must be 
included “in promotional materials [the institution] makes available to 
prospective students” and be “[p]rominently provide[d] . . . in a simple 
and meaningful manner on the home page of its program Web site.”
136
B. Summary Disclosure and Full Disclosure 
Disclosure requirements of this kind are designed to inform 
consumers at the point of purchase or decision, often with brief 
summaries of relevant information. Such “summary disclosures” are 
often complemented with more robust information, typically found on 
public or private websites. For example, the EPA offers a great deal of 
material on fuel economy online, going well beyond the information 
that is available on stickers.
137 The nutrition facts label is supplemented 
by a great deal of nutritional information on government websites.
138 
Approaches of this kind provide information that private individuals 
                                                                                                                         
  134 29 CFR § 2550.404a-5. For a summary of the rule, see Employee Benefits Security 
Administration, Fact Sheet: Final Rule to Improve Transparency of Fees and Expenses to Workers 
in 401(k)-Type Retirement Plans, online at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsparticipantfee 
rule.html (visited May 29, 2011). For a model chart that companies may use to help their 
employees to compare retirement plan options under the new rule, see Employee Benefits 
Security Administration, Model Comparative Chart, online at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa 
/participantfeerulemodelchart.doc (visited May 29, 2011). 
  135 Department of Education, Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed Reg 66832, codified in 
various sections of Title 34 of the CFR. 
  136  34 CFR § 668.6. For a summary of the rule, see Department of Education, Department of 
Education Establishes New Student Aid Rules to Protect Borrowers and Taxpayers (Oct 28, 2010), 
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  137  See Environmental Protection Agency, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, online 
at http://www.fueleconomy.gov (visited Apr 5, 2011). 
  138  See Department of Agriculture, Nutrition.gov, online at http://www.nutrition.gov (visited 
Apr 5, 2011). See also Department of Agriculture, http://www.choosemyplate.gov (visited 
June 13, 2011). 1384  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
and institutions can adapt, reassemble, and present in new, helpful, 
imaginative, and often unanticipated ways. Some of the most valuable 
and creative uses of full disclosure are made by the private sector. 
Other disclosure requirements are not specifically directed to 
consumers or end users at all. They promote public understanding of 
existing problems and help produce possible solutions by informing 
people about current practices. One example is the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986.
139 At first, this 
law seemed to be largely a bookkeeping measure, requiring a “Toxic 
Release Inventory” (TRI) in which firms reported what pollutants 
they were using.
140 Available evidence indicates that the TRI has had 
beneficial effects, helping to spur reductions in toxic releases 
throughout the United States.
141 One reason involves public 
accountability: public attention can help promote behavior that fits 
with statutory purposes.
142  
In 2009 and 2010, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) placed a significant subset of its fatality, 
illness, and injury data online, in a step that should promote both 
accountability and safer workplaces.
143 In 2009, the EPA issued a 
greenhouse gas reporting rule, requiring disclosure by many of the 
most significant emitters.
144 The data may well help businesses to find 
innovative ways to track their own emissions,  to compare them to 
similar facilities, and eventually to identify low-cost reductions.  
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has similarly published dozens 
of datasets involving crime, enforcement, and prison,
145 and it is 
considering others for future release. Similarly, the Department of 
Labor’s “Searchable Enforcement Database” provides the public with 
one-stop access to enforcement data across the department (for 
example, Mines and Chemical Hazards).
146 The EPA has taken a similar 
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approach.
147 Generalizing from these practices, President Barack Obama 
has issued a memorandum requiring agencies “with broad regulatory 
compliance and administrative enforcement responsibilities” to 
“develop plans to make public information concerning their regulatory 
compliance and enforcement activities accessible, downloadable, and 
searchable online.”
148 
These steps fit well with the goals of the Office of Management 
and Budget’s (OMB) “Open Government Directive,” which is 
intended in part to ensure that high-value data sets are placed 
online.
149 Posting such data sets online can promote regulatory goals by 
virtue of the power of publicity. Indeed, many high-value data sets 
count as such because their publication helps agencies to further their 
statutory missions. The OMB directive explicitly emphasizes this 
point,
150 and numerous agencies have disclosed high-value data sets
151 
and developed open government plans.
152 Disclosure of many of the 
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data sets (for example, in the domain of safety and health) should 
promote agency missions; the open government plans enlist openness 
in part for the same reason. 
Disclosure is also used as a check on certain increases in health 
insurance premiums. For plan years beginning in 2010, § 1004 of the 
Affordable Care Act requires that the secretary of HHS and the states 
establish a process for the annual review of “unreasonable increases” 
in premiums for health insurance coverage.
153 That process shall 
“require health insurance issuers to submit to the Secretary and the 
relevant State a justification for an unreasonable premium increase 
prior to the implementation of the increase.”
154 Moreover, “such issuers 
shall prominently post such information on their Internet websites,” 
and the “Secretary shall ensure the public disclosure of information 
on such increases and justifications for all health insurance issuers.”
155 
In addition to making data more accessible, some agencies are 
attempting to make data more readily usable. An example of this kind 
of clean, clear, and flexible transparency technology is eXtensible 
Business Reporting Language (XBRL).
156 XBRL is an open standard 
for creating electronic reports and exchanging data via the web. Using 
a standardized series of “tags” for labeling information, XBRL 
essentially allows anyone to download and analyze large amounts of 
data using a simple spreadsheet.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission has required 
companies that have a market capitalization over $5 billion and that 
use US accounting rules to submit all filings via the XBRL format. 
The relevant rule, entitled “Interactive Data to Improve Financial 
Reporting,”
157 requires  
companies to provide financial statement information in a form 
that is intended to improve its usefulness to investors. In this 
format, financial statement information could be downloaded 
directly into spreadsheets, analyzed in a variety of ways using 
commercial off-the-shelf software, and used within investment 
models in other software formats. . . . The new rules are intended 
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not only to make financial information easier for investors to 
analyze, but also to assist in automating regulatory  filings and 
business information processing. Interactive data has the 
potential to increase the speed, accuracy and usability of financial 
disclosure, and eventually reduce costs.
158 
The requirement will be phased in over three years for smaller public 
companies and mutual funds.
159 
To be sure, mandatory disclosure can impose costs and burdens 
on both private and public institutions, and to the extent permitted by 
law, those costs and burdens should be considered when deciding 
whether and how to proceed. Empirical evidence on the actual effects 
of disclosure policies is indispensable.
160  
C. Disclosure and Regulatory Impact Analysis 
If regulation is to be empirically informed, it must be preceded by 
a careful analysis of its rationale and its likely consequences. Is 
regulation justified by a market failure—as, for example, in the form 
of an absence of adequate information? What are the benefits of the 
proposed action, in both qualitative and quantitative terms? What are 
the costs? What are the alternatives to the proposed action—are they 
more stringent, less stringent, or perhaps simply different? Do the 
benefits justify the costs, and if so, has the agency chosen the approach 
that maximizes net benefits? Do considerations of human dignity or 
equity bear on the agency’s decision?
161 
Executive Orders 13563 and 12866 explicitly draw attention to 
questions of this sort, especially through their identification of 
“principles of regulation.”
162 Executive Order 13563 incorporates and 
reaffirms the principles in Executive Order 12866. Stressing the 
importance of attempting to measure and improve “the actual results 
of regulatory requirements,” it specifically adds that “each agency is 
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directed to use the best available techniques to quantify anticipated 
present and future benefits as accurately as possible”—and that “each 
agency may consider (and discuss qualitatively) values that are 
difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, 
fairness, and distributive impacts.”
163 
Implementing Executive Order 12866, OMB Circular A-4 
provides technical guidance for regulatory impact analyses, required 
for regulations whose annual impact exceeds $100 million.
164 Taken as 
a whole, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order 12866, and OMB 
Circular A-4 can be seen as (among other things) efforts to use 
disclosure as a way of policing and disciplining regulations by ensuring 
that agencies have relied not on intuitions, anecdotes, or guesswork, 
but on a careful assessment of the likely consequences of proposed 
courses of action. To the extent feasible, that assessment should be 
exposed to public scrutiny and review, and it should be corrected, if 
necessary, in light of what is learned through that process.
165  
Note in this regard that Executive Order 13563 requires agencies 
to provide “timely online access to the rulemaking docket on 
regulations.gov, including relevant scientific and technical findings,”
166 
with an opportunity for public comment “on all pertinent parts of the 
rulemaking docket.”
167 To be empirically informed, regulatory choices 
must be based on a careful assessment of relevant facts, and such 
choices should, to the extent feasible, be subject to public review and 
comment. 
OIRA has posted a simple checklist and also a primer for 
regulatory impact analyses, as well as answers to frequently asked 
questions about such analyses.
 168  All of these documents are designed 
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to promote simplicity and clarity for agencies and the public alike, and 
thus to improve disclosure of the anticipated consequences of 
regulatory choices. The checklist is reproduced as Appendix C. 
It is true, of course, that prospective analysis of costs and benefits, 
even if done carefully and subject to public scrutiny, may rest on 
speculative assumptions. To be empirically informed, regulations should 
be revisited and reviewed retrospectively, to ensure that they are 
promoting their intended functions, and are not producing excessive 
costs or unintended adverse side effects. Executive Order 13563 
expressly recognizes this point in calling for “retrospective analysis” of 
existing significant rules and in requiring agencies to produce 
preliminary plans for such analysis.
169  
In their preliminary plans for retrospective review, often informed 
by public input and in some cases by meetings held nationwide,
170 
agencies identified numerous reforms, candidate rules for review, and 
initiatives already underway. In recognition of the emphasis in 
Executive Order 13563 on public participation in the rulemaking 
process, agencies made these preliminary plans publicly available and 
requested public comments and suggestions.
171    
Agencies’ final plans, released under Executive Order 13563, 
highlight numerous initiatives, and they promise billions of dollars of 
savings and millions of hours of reductions in annual paperwork and 
reporting requirements.
172  
To offer just a few examples: 
• HHS plans to remove unnecessary regulatory and reporting 
requirements now imposed on hospitals and other health care 
providers, potentially saving an anticipated $3 billion or more 
over the next five years.
173  
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• The Department of Labor is finalizing a rule to simplify and to 
improve hazard warnings for workers, likely saving employers 
over $2.5 billion over the next five years while increasing 
safety.
174 
• The Department of Transportation proposed a rule that will 
eliminate unnecessary regulation of the railroad industry, 
saving up to $340 million in the near future, and avoiding the 
risk that regulatory costs will be passed on to consumers.
175 
• The EPA plans to propose a rule to reduce burdens on 
hazardous waste generators by moving from paper-based to 
electronic reporting, saving up to $124 million annually.
176 
• OSHA issued a final rule that will remove over 1.9 million 
annual hours of redundant reporting burdens on employers 
and save more than $40 million in annual costs.
177  
• Since the 1970s, milk has been defined as an “oil” and subject 
to costly rules designed to prevent oil spills.  In response to 
objections from the agriculture community and the President’s 
directive, EPA concluded that the rules placed unjustifiable 
burdens on dairy farmers and exempted them. The projected 
annual savings are around $145 million.
178  
• The EPA is proposing to eliminate the obligation for many 
states to require air pollution vapor recovery systems at local 
gas stations, on the ground that modern vehicles already have 
effective air pollution control technologies.   The anticipated 
annual savings are about $87 million.
179 
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• The Departments of Commerce and State are undertaking a 
series of steps to eliminate unnecessary barriers to exports, 
including duplicative and unnecessary regulatory requirements, 
thus reducing the cumulative burden and uncertainty faced by 
American companies and their trading partners.
180  
• To reduce administrative burdens and increase certainty, the 
Department of the Interior is reviewing outdated regulations 
under the Endangered Species Act of 1973
181 to streamline the 
process, to reduce requirements for written descriptions, and to 
clarify and expedite procedures for approval of conservation 
agreements.
182 
Retrospective analysis has long been recommended by those 
interested in empirical assessment of regulations. Consider this 
suggestion from Michael Greenstone, former chief economist at the 
Council of Economic Advisers: “The single greatest problem with the 
current system is that most regulations are subject to a cost–benefit 
analysis only in advance of their implementation. This is the point 
when the least is known and any analysis must rest on many 
unverifiable and potentially controversial assumptions.”
183  
By contrast, retrospective analysis can help show what works and 
what does not, and in the process can promote the repeal or 
streamlining of less effective rules and the strengthening or expansion 
of those that turn out to do more good than harm. Greenstone thus 
urges a series of reforms designed to “instill a culture of 
experimentation and evaluation.”
184 These reforms include an effort to 
ensure that regulations are written and implemented in ways that lend 
themselves to experimental evaluation and creation of independent 
review to assess the effectiveness of regulations.  
One of Greenstone’s principal themes is the importance of 
experimentation with respect to the likely effects of regulation. There 
has been a great deal of recent interest in the use of randomized 
controlled trials as a means of learning the effects of policy 
initiatives.
185 In the regulatory area, the use of such trials remains in a 
preliminary state, but it is easy to imagine projects that would test the 
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effects of potential rules by examining their consequences in this way. 
Such projects might, for example, explore the effects of efforts to 
reduce distracted driving. More generally, experimentation might take 
the form of advance testing of regulatory alternatives, followed by a 
study of their consequences, at least if the law authorizes such 
approaches.
186  
Of course there are constraints—involving not merely law but 
also resources and feasibility—in using randomized controlled trials in 
the regulatory context, but in some cases, they might be both 
appropriate and highly useful. The plans released under Executive 
Order 13563 offer relevant discussion. For example, the Department 
of Treasury states that it will work to “develop and incorporate 
experimental designs into retrospective analysis, when appropriate.”
187 
The Department of Labor states that it “is contemplating how to 
incorporate the use of experimental designs to determine the impact 
of various regulations.”
188  The Department of Interior states that it 
“will consider” the use of “experimental or quasi-experimental 
designs, including randomized controlled trials.”
189 
III.   DEFAULT RULES AND SIMPLIFICATION 
Social science research provides strong evidence that starting 
points, or “default rules,” greatly affect social outcomes.
190 In some 
contexts, it may be possible to promote statutory goals with sensible 
default rules that preserve freedom of choice and that might help to 
avoid the rigidity, cost, and unintended adverse consequences of 
mandates and bans. In the abstract, of course, there may not be an 
obviously appropriate default rule; the choice is best made by 
reference to statutory goals and policy commitments.  
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Default rules are one way of easing people’s choices, and they are 
used in countless domains by both public and private institutions. 
There are other ways of easing choices. One example is simplification, 
as with communications and forms that are shorter, easier, more 
intuitive, electronic, and in some cases prepopulated with information, 
thus reducing burdens on those who are asked to fill them out. 
A. Automatic Enrollment, Default Rules, and Related Approaches: 
Examples 
1. Savings.  
In the United States, employers have long asked workers whether 
they want to enroll in 401(k) plans; under a common approach, the 
default rule is nonenrollment. Even when enrollment is easy, the 
number of employees who enroll, or opt in, has sometimes been 
relatively low.
191 Recently, a number of employers have responded by 
changing the default to automatic enrollment, by which employees are 
enrolled unless they opt out. The results are clear: significantly more 
employees end up enrolled with an opt-out design than with opt-in.
192 
This is so even when opting out is easy. Importantly, automatic 
enrollment has significant benefits for all groups, with increased 
anticipated savings for Hispanics, African Americans, and women in 
particular.
193  
The Pension Protection Act of 2006
194 (PPA) draws directly on 
these findings by encouraging employers to adopt automatic 
enrollment plans. The PPA does this by providing nondiscrimination 
safe harbors for elective deferrals and for matching contributions 
under plans that include an automatic enrollment feature, as well as 
by providing protections from state payroll-withholding laws to allow 
for automatic enrollment.
195 Building on these efforts, President 
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Obama has asked the IRS and the Treasury Department to undertake 
initiatives to make it easier for employers to adopt such plans.
196 
PPA created two types of new automatic contribution 
arrangements. The first is a safe-harbor design for automatic 
enrollment plans called a “qualified automatic contribution 
arrangement” (QACA).
197 To qualify as a QACA, the arrangement 
generally must satisfy design-based safe-harbor requirements such as 
qualified minimum percentage amounts, an annual employee notice, 
and certain vesting for matching contributions. The second is an 
“eligible automatic contribution arrangement” (EACA).
198 Plans that 
meet the EACA requirements may allow employees to elect to 
withdraw automatic contributions no later than 90 days from the date 
their contributions start without incurring the 10  percent early 
withdrawal tax.  
In 2009, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) promulgated final 
regulations with respect to automatic contribution arrangements 
(automatic enrollment) in individual account defined contribution 
plans.
199 To qualify as a QACA, an eligible employee must be enrolled 
in the plan at a specified automatic contribution rate (that is, qualified 
percentage), beginning with an initial minimum contribution rate of 
3 percent of the employee’s compensation. The default election ends 
when an automatic enrollee affirmatively elects to opt out or to 
contribute a different amount. The EACA requirements include 
uniform default deferral rates and notices to employees that are 
generally similar to those for a QACA. 
2. Health care.  
A provision of the Affordable Care Act requires employers with 
over two hundred employees automatically to enroll employees in 
health care plans, while also allowing employees to opt out.
200 On 
February 4, 2010, the Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) provided guidance to states via a state health official (SHO) 
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letter.
201 The guidance permits states automatically to enroll and renew 
eligible children in Medicaid or Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP). This approach allows states to initiate and determine 
eligibility for Medicaid or CHIP without a signed Medicaid or CHIP 
program application, as long as the family or child consents to be 
enrolled in Medicaid or CHIP.
3. School meals.  
The National School Lunch Act
202 takes steps to allow “direct 
certification” of eligibility, thus reducing complexity and introducing 
what can be seen as a form of automatic enrollment. Under the 
program, children who are eligible for benefits under certain programs 
will be “directly eligible” for free lunches and free breakfasts, and hence 
will not have to fill out additional applications.
203 To promote direct 
certification, the USDA has issued an interim final rule that is expected 
to provide up to 270,000 children with school meals.
204 
4. Payroll statements.  
The Department of Homeland Security has changed the default 
setting for payroll statements to electronic from paper, thus reducing 
costs.
205 In general, changes of this kind promise to save significant 
sums of money for both private and public sectors.  
5. Childhood obesity.  
A great deal of empirical work identifies accessibility as a 
noteworthy contributor to the problem of obesity, including childhood 
obesity. If healthy foods are easily accessible, people are far more 
likely to choose them, and the same is true for unhealthy foods. 
Indeed, convenience and accessibility can significantly increase caloric 
intake.
206 Some studies have found that when fast food restaurants are 
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located near schools or residences, significant weight gain occurs in 
both children and pregnant women.
207  
Even small differences can have large effects on food choices and 
consumption. For example, the sizes of plates and portions have been 
increasing over time, and they affect how much people eat; and when 
unhealthy foods are made slightly less accessible, their consumption is 
reduced.
208 These and related issues are discussed in the report of the 
White House Task Force on Childhood Obesity, which emphasizes the 
importance of accessibility.
209 
These and other features of social contexts may not create literal 
default rules, but they can produce something closely akin to them for 
food choices. The relevant findings—about the importance of 
seemingly small features of context
210—have implications for 
continuing efforts to reduce childhood obesity and many other 
problems. One study, for example, finds that if people are prompted to 
consider whether to “downsize” their meals through a simple 
question, they will eat significantly less at fast food restaurants.
211 
Indeed, the effect of this prompt was found to be greater than that of 
calorie labeling. The authors suggest that at least some consumers may 
have difficulty in “determining appropriate portion sizes and knowing 
when to stop eating” and urge that “a subtle change in the fast-food 
ordering process can initiate self-control.”
212  
Their central finding is that many people think that portions are 
excessively large, and when people are asked, “Would you like to cut 
more than 200 calories from your meal by taking a half portion of 
your side dish?” they answer in the affirmative about 35 percent of the 
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time. Notably, the “downsize” offer receives about the same number of 
acceptances (32 percent) when it is accompanied by a 25 cent 
discount. One of the striking implications here is that the “downsize” 
question served simultaneously to save costs for restaurants and to 
reduce calorie consumption. Another implication is that verbal 
prompts can serve some of the functions of default rules. 
This catalogue of illustrations suggests that it would be valuable 
to identify other contexts in which automatic enrollment, 
simplification, increased accessibility, or prompts might operate in the 
service of legal requirements and agreed-upon social goals. Of course 
it is possible to imagine default rules, or approaches to automatic 
enrollment, that are harmful or counterproductive; this risk is 
discussed below. 
B. Automatic Enrollment and Default Rules: Mechanisms and 
Complexities 
1. Explanations.  
A great deal of research has attempted to explore exactly why 
default rules have such a large effect on outcomes.
213 There appear to 
be three contributing factors. The first involves inertia and 
procrastination.
214 To alter the effect of the default rule, people must 
make an active choice to reject that rule. In view of the power of 
inertia and the tendency to procrastinate, people may simply continue 
with the status quo. It follows that self-consciously and well-chosen 
default rules by individuals, or by private or public institutions, can 
operate as commitment devices. Consider, for example, a voluntarily 
chosen default rule in favor of a monthly transfer of money into a 
savings account, or automatic enrollments in a program to provide 
savings for retirement. 
The second factor involves what might be taken to be an implicit 
endorsement of the default rule. Many people appear to think that the 
default was chosen for a reason. They believe that they should not 
                                                                                                                         
  213  See, for example, William G. Gale, J. Mark Iwry, and Spencer Walters, Retirement Savings 
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Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions, 124 Q J Econ 1639, 1641–43 (2009). 
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depart from it unless they have particular information to justify a 
change.
215  
Third, the default rule might establish the reference point for 
people’s decisions; the established reference point has significant 
effects because people dislike losses from that reference point.
216 If, for 
example, the default rule favors energy-efficient light bulbs, then the 
loss (in terms of reduced efficiency) may loom large and people will 
continue to purchase energy-efficient light bulbs. But if the default 
rule favors less efficient (and initially less expensive) light bulbs, then 
the loss in terms of upfront costs may loom large, and there will be a 
tendency to favor less efficient light bulbs.
217 
2. Which default rule?  
In a significant number of domains, it might be possible to 
achieve regulatory goals, and to do so while maintaining freedom of 
choice and at low cost, by selecting good default rules and by avoiding 
harmful ones. The initial task, of course, is to identify the requirements 
of the law. Within the context of such requirements, one approach is to 
select the default rule that reflects what most people would choose if 
they were adequately informed.
218 Suppose, for example, that a 
particular default rule would place a strong majority of the relevant 
population in the situation that they would favor if they made an 
informed choice. If so, there is a legitimate reason to adopt that 
default rule (with the understanding that those who differ from the 
majority may opt out).  
Of course, it might be necessary to do a great deal of work in 
order to identify the approach that informed people would choose, 
and on this count, actual evidence about informed choice is extremely 
important. The issue is simplified if the law requires a particular set of 
outcomes. A default rule might well make sense if it promotes 
automatic compliance with the law. Hence it is important to see that 
use of default rules may serve either as an independent approach, 
chosen instead of a mandate or a ban, or as a complementary 
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approach, operating to facilitate compliance with statutory or 
regulatory requirements.  
3. Risks. 
It is also important to see that default rules can be badly chosen 
or misused by private and public institutions alike, and that some such 
rules can be harmful. The FTC has expressed serious concerns about 
“negative option marketing,” which occurs when those who accept a 
“free” product are automatically enrolled in a plan or program that 
carries a monthly fee (unless they explicitly opt out).
219 In some cases, 
negative option marketing has the unfortunate effect of using a 
default rule to exploit the tendency toward inertia in a potentially 
harmful manner. It is easy to imagine both private and public 
analogues. Consider, for example, an automatic enrollment policy that 
puts an unreasonably large amount of salary into savings.  
To evaluate the use of automatic enrollment, the particular 
circumstances certainly matter. If automatic enrollment is not made 
transparent to those who are enrolled, it can be considered a form of 
manipulation, and the problem is worse if it is not in their long-term 
interest. 
4. Personalized default rules. 
Some default rules apply to all of the relevant population, subject 
to the ability to opt out. Other default rules are personalized, in the 
sense that they draw on available information about which approach 
best suits individuals, and potentially even each individual, in the 
relevant population. A personalized default might be based on 
geographical or demographic variables; for example, income and age 
might be used in determining appropriate default rules for retirement 
plans. Alternatively, a personalized default might be based on people’s 
own past choices to the extent that they are available.  
An advantage of personalized default rules is that they may well 
be more accurate and fine-grained than “mass” default rules. As 
technology evolves, it should be increasingly possible to produce 
personalized defaults, based on people’s own choices and situations. 
For this reason, there will be promising opportunities to use default 
rules to promote people’s welfare. To be sure, any such rules must 
respect the applicable laws, policies, and regulations involving 
personal privacy and should avoid unduly crude proxies. 
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5. Nonsticky default rules. 
It is important to note that default rules may not “stick” when the 
relevant population has strong contrary preferences. For example, a 
study in the United Kingdom found that most people rejected a savings 
plan with an unusually high default contribution rate (12 percent of 
before-tax income).
220 Only about 25 percent of employees remained at 
that rate after a year, whereas about sixty of employees remained at a 
lower default contribution rate. One implication is that “extreme” 
defaults are less likely to stick. Another implication, based on the lower 
incomes of those who stayed with the default, is that default rules may 
be more influential for low-income workers than for their higher-
earning counterparts.
221  
A related finding is that workers were not much affected by a 
default allocation of a fraction of their tax refund to US savings bonds, 
apparently because such workers had definite plans to spend their 
refunds.
222 A general lesson is that default rules will have a weaker 
effect, and potentially no effect, when the relevant population has a 
strong preference for a certain outcome. 
C. Active Choices 
An alternative approach, sometimes worth serious con-
sideration, is to avoid any default rule and to require active choices.
223 
Under this approach, people are required to make an actual choice 
among the various options; they are not defaulted into any particular 
alternative. With respect to savings, for example, an employer might 
reject both opt-out and opt-in and simply require employees to 
indicate their preferences. Evidence suggests that active choices 
result in far higher levels of savings than default rules that require 
people explicitly to opt in.
224  
If inertia and procrastination are playing a significant role, active 
choosing may be better than opt-in, in which some people end up with 
outcomes that they would not prefer if they were to make a choice. In 
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such circumstances, active choosing increases the likelihood that 
people will end up with their preferred outcomes.  
Active choosing might also be preferred when public officials 
lack relevant information, so that the chosen default rule might be 
harmful to some or many. This is an especially important point. If 
officials are inadequately informed, and if the default rule is no better 
than a guess, that rule might lead people in the wrong direction. The 
same point argues against a default rule when self-interested private 
groups are calling for it even though it is not in the interest of those on 
whom it is imposed. Active choosing is much less risky on these 
counts. 
As compared with either opt-in or opt-out, active choosing can 
have significant advantages when the relevant group has a great deal 
of diversity so that a single approach is unlikely to fit variable 
circumstances.
225 In such contexts, a default rule may also be harmful, 
because the power of inertia, or the force of suggestion, may mean 
that many people will end up in a situation that is not in their interest. 
For this reason, active choosing may be better.  
On the other hand, active choosing can have significant 
disadvantages. One disadvantage is that in situations of unfamiliarity 
or great complexity, in which people lack information or experience, 
active choosing may be unhelpful and may impose unjustified or 
excessive burdens. These burdens include the resources required to 
enforce the requirement to choose and the time required for people to 
obtain relevant information and to decide what choice to make. As 
compared with a default rule, active choosing increases the costs of 
decisions, possibly significantly; it might also increase errors, possibly 
significantly, if the area is unfamiliar and confusing. In such situations, 
opt-in or opt-out might produce better outcomes for people.  
In the private sector, default rules are often in people’s interests, 
and active choosing could impose unnecessary burdens. When public 
officials have good reason to believe that a particular default rule will 
fit with the informed preferences of the relevant group, and thus 
promote its interests, it may be preferable to select that default rule 
rather than to require active choosing.
226 Personalized default rules, by 
virtue of their accuracy, have particular virtues on this count. 
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D. Simplification 
Where it is not possible or best to change the default, significant 
benefits might be obtained merely by simplifying and easing people’s 
choices. Complexity can have serious unintended effects (including 
indifference, delay, and confusion), potentially undermining regulatory 
goals by reducing compliance or by decreasing the likelihood that 
people will benefit from various policies and programs.  
With respect to rules in general, Executive Order 13563 directs 
agencies to promote “coordination, simplification, and harmonization.”
227 
With respect to forms in particular, undue complexity can severely 
discourage applications, thus compromising important programs, and 
simplification can have surprisingly large benefits. For some public 
programs, take-up rates are relatively low even though the cost of 
participation is small. Behavioral factors, including inertia, are 
contributing factors, and some form of simplification or automatic 
enrollment might help.
228  
For example, a series of steps have been taken recently toward 
simplifying the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), 
reducing the number of questions through skip logic (a survey method 
that uses previous responses to determine subsequent questions) and 
allowing electronic retrieval of information.
229 Use of a simpler and 
shorter form is accompanied by a pilot initiative to permit online users 
to transfer data previously supplied electronically on relevant tax 
forms directly into their FAFSA applications.
230  
These steps are intended to simplify the application process for 
financial aid and thus to increase access to college. There is good 
reason to believe that such steps will enable many students to receive 
aid when they previously could not do so. Similar steps might be taken 
in many other domains. Considerable thought should be given to the 
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question whether complexity is having unintended adverse effects and 
undermining regulatory programs.  
The Department of Treasury has also launched an important 
initiative in the domain of Social Security and Supplemental Security 
Income: the “Direct Express” card program.
231 Many people are now 
automatically receiving their money via a prepaid debit card. This 
measure increases, at the same time, both convenience and accuracy, 
thus reducing paperwork and costs. It provides particular help for 
those who lack bank accounts. Other programs might build on this 
approach by considering the choice between an opt-in and opt-out 
design and simplifying people’s choices. Some such programs might be 
designed to help those without bank accounts, by giving them such 
accounts or the functional equivalent.
232 
In 2010, the Treasury Department took several steps to increase 
simplicity by moving to electronic systems. Perhaps most importantly, 
the department finalized a rule to provide electronic payments to 
people receiving Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, 
Veterans, Railroad Retirement, and Office of Personnel Management 
benefits.
233   
It is estimated that these steps will save over $400 million in the 
first five years.
234 The initiatives from the Treasury Department are in 
line with a 2010 request from OMB asking agencies for initiatives that 
would promote electronic reporting through “fillable fileable” forms, 
substitute electronic for paper signatures, increase administrative 
simplification, and reduce burdens on small business.
235 That request in 
turn produced seventy-two initiatives from various agencies, all 
designed to reduce burdens and to increase simplification.
236 In total, 
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those initiatives are expected to eliminate millions of hours of 
paperwork and reporting burdens each year. 
In 2011, OMB followed the 2010 request with a new one, also 
emphasizing simplification and focusing on small business and benefit 
programs.
237 The request drew particular attention to the potential 
harms of complexity, noting that  
the process of renewing or applying for benefits can be time-
consuming, confusing, and unnecessarily complex, thus 
discouraging participation and undermining program goals. 
Sometimes agencies collect data that are unchanged from prior 
applications; in such circumstances, they might be able to use, or 
to give people the option to use, pre-populated electronic forms.
238 
As noted above, there is reason to believe that imperfect take-up of 
existing benefit programs, including those that provide income support, 
is partly a product of behavioral factors such as procrastination and 
inertia.
239 It follows that efforts to increase simplicity, including 
automatic enrollment, may have substantial benefits.
240  
E. Structuring Choices 
Complexity can also create problems through a phenomenon 
known as choice overload. In the traditional view, having more choices 
helps and never harms consumers or program participants. This view is 
based on the reasonable judgment that if an additional option is not 
better than existing options, people will simply not choose it. In 
general, more choices are indeed desirable, but an increasing body of 
research offers certain potential qualifications, especially in unusually 
complex situations.
241 For example, there is some evidence that 
enrollment may decline,
242 and asset allocations may worsen,
243 as the 
menu of investment options in a 401(k) plan expands.  
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Responding to this general problem in the context of prescription 
drug plans, CMS has taken steps to maintain freedom of choice while 
also reducing unhelpful and unnecessary complexity.
244 The CMS 
Medicare Part D program rules require sponsors to ensure that when 
they provide multiple plan offerings, those offerings have meaningful 
differences. The rules also eliminate plans with persistently low 
enrollments, on the ground that those plans increase the complexity of 
choices without adding value.
245 
IV.  INCREASING SALIENCE 
It is often possible to promote regulatory goals by making certain 
features of a product or a situation more salient to consumers. As a 
simple example of salience effects, consider alcohol taxes. There is 
evidence that when such taxes are specifically identified in the posted 
price, increases in such taxes have a larger negative effect on alcohol 
consumption than when taxes are applied at the register.
246 Incentives 
matter, but in order to matter, they must be salient.
247 Sensible regulatory 
policies, especially those that involve disclosure, are attentive to the 
importance of salience.  
People’s attention is limited, and regulatory goals are not always 
served merely by altering policy or disclosing information. The 
relevant policy or information must also be salient. In the context of 
fiscal policy, consider the question whether to provide payments in the 
form of a one-time check or instead in the form of reduced 
withholding. Would one or another approach lead to increased 
spending?  
In the abstract, it might be predicted that there would be no 
difference as a result of delivery method. But evidence suggests that a 
one-time stimulus payment has significantly greater effects in 
increasing spending than does an economically equivalent reduction 
                                                                                                                         
  243 See Sheena S. Iyengar and Emir Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and 
Asset Allocation, 94 J Pub Econ 530, 536–38 (2010). 
  244  For a discussion of the underlying problem, see Jason Abaluck and Jonathan Gruber, 
Choice Inconsistencies among the Elderly: Evidence from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D 
Program, 101 Am Econ Rev 1180, 1206–08 (2011). 
  245 See  42  CFR  § 422.506(b)(1)(iv). For a related discussion, with particular emphasis on the 
abilities of those who create menus, see David Goldreich and Hanna Hałaburda,  Rational 
Preference for Smaller Menus: Variability in Menu-Setting Ability and 401(k) Plans *3 (2011), 
online at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-086.pdf (visited Apr 7, 2011). 
  246 See Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and 
Evidence, 99 Am Econ Rev 1145, 1163 (2009). For a discussion in a similar vein, see Amy 
Finkelstein, E-ZTAX: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q J Econ 969, 1008–09 (2009). 
  247  See Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan, Policy and Choice at 126–27 (cited in note 2).  1406  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
in withholding.
248 A potential explanation, with support in the 
evidence, involves the importance of salience or visibility. In a relevant 
study, a majority of households did not notice the withholding 
changes, and households who found “a small but repeated boost to 
their paychecks” appear to be less likely to use the money for 
significant purchases.
249 
There are many potential applications. With respect to smoking 
prevention, for example, increased salience is a central purpose of 
disclosure requirements. The Smoking Prevention Act recognizes this 
point in calling for new and more graphic warnings; the chosen images 
are vivid and will be highly salient.
250 Similarly, OSHA has proposed a 
regulation that would require chemical manufacturers and importers to 
prepare labels for hazardous chemicals that include pictograms and 
signal words that can be easily understood by workers.
251 Well-designed 
labels make relevant factors salient to those who will see them. The 
significant consequences of easy accessibility and convenience (return 
to the issue of obesity) can be seen as close cousins of salience effects.
252 
A similar point applies in the domain of energy efficiency. For 
many consumers, the potential savings of energy-efficient products 
may not be salient at the time of purchase, even if those savings are 
significant. The “Energy Paradox” refers to the fact that some 
consumers do not purchase energy-efficient products even when it is 
clearly in their economic interest to do so. Empirical work suggests 
that nonprice interventions, by making the effects of energy use more 
salient, can alter decisions and significantly reduce electricity use.
253 
There is evidence that such interventions can lead to private as well as 
public savings.
254 Consider, for example, the fact that energy costs are 
                                                                                                                         
  248  See Claudia R. Sahm, Matthew D. Shapiro, and Joel Slemrod, Check in the Mail or More in 
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(Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2010-40, Feb 2011), online at http:// 
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  252  See notes 206–12 and accompanying text. 
  253  See Allcott and Mullainathan, 327 Sci at 1204 (cited in note 75); Paul J. Ferraro and 
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Scale Field Experiment *20–22 (NBER Working Paper No 17189, July 2011), online at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17189.pdf (visited Aug 28, 2011) (finding that social comparison 
information significantly decreased water consumption). For a discussion of the importance of 
reminders in increasing savings, with particular emphasis on salience, see Karlan, et al, Getting to 
the Top of Mind at *23–24 (cited in note 8). For a discussion of the policy implications of 
consumer inattention in the context of energy savings, see Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky, 
Externalizing the Internality at *5–7 (cited in note 28). 
  254  See Richard B. Howarth, Brent M. Haddad, and Bruce Paton, The Economics of Energy 
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generally salient only once a month, when people are presented with 
the bill. Efforts to increase the salience of such costs, by displaying 
them in real time, can produce real savings.
255 
Executive Order 13514 is an effort to cut costs and reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by setting energy and environmental goals 
and by imposing a series of requirements on federal agencies.
256 One of 
the central goals of this executive order is to make certain costs more 
visible and salient than they have been within the federal government. 
Recent efforts to respond to the problem of childhood obesity 
similarly attempt to increase the salience of the health risks and of 
numerous small choices that, in the aggregate, contribute to that 
problem.
257 Consider, in a similar vein, the suggestion that pediatricians 
calculate the body mass index (BMI) of young children and inform 
parents of the results;
258 this suggestion is an effort to increase the 
salience of important health-related information. 
A related approach attempts to identify and consider the frame 
through which people interpret information. There is evidence that 
some consumers may not seriously consider annuities in retirement to 
insure against longevity risk (the risk that they will outlive their 
assets) because they do not fully appreciate the potential advantages 
of annuities.
259 One hypothesis is that some people evaluate annuities 
in an investment frame that focuses narrowly on risk and return.
260 
Looking through such a frame, consumers focus on the risk that they 
could die soon after annuity purchase and lose all of their money. 
Some evidence suggests that efforts to shift consumers into a 
consumption frame, which focuses on the end result of what they can 
consume over time, help consumers to appreciate the potential 
benefits of annuities.
261 The goal here is emphatically not to suggest a 
view on any particular approach to retirement; it is merely to 
emphasize that the relevant frame can increase salience.  
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V.  SOCIAL NORMS 
Social scientists have emphasized the importance of social 
practices and norms, which have a significant influence on individual 
decisions.
262 If people learn that they are using more energy than 
similarly situated others, their energy use may decline—saving money 
while also reducing pollution.
263 The same point applies to health-
related behavior. It has long been understood that people are more 
likely to engage in healthy behavior if they live or work with others 
who engage in such behavior.
264 And if people are in a social network 
with other people who are obese, they are more likely to become 
obese themselves.
265 The behavior of relevant others can provide 
valuable information about sensible or appropriate courses of action. 
As noted above, informational cascades are a possible consequence, as 
people rely on, and thus amplify, the informational signals produced 
by the actions of their predecessors. Similarly, those actions can 
provide information about what others will approve and disapprove.
266 
These points have implications for regulatory policy. For example, 
smoking and seat belt regulations appear to have worked hand in 
hand with emerging social norms, helping to reduce deaths and 
injuries. In the context of seat belt usage, there has been a dramatic 
change in behavior, with an increase in a few decades from usage rates 
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  263 See  Allcott,  Social Norms and Energy Conservation at *16–17 (cited in note 32). See also 
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note 253). 
  264 See  Jean  K.  Langlie,  Social Networks, Health Beliefs, and Preventive Health Behavior, 
18 J Health & Soc Behav 244, 244–45 (1977). 
  265 Christakis  and  Fowler,  Connected at 105–12 (cited in note 262). 
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under 15 percent to usage rates well over 70 percent,
267 in significant 
part as a result of social norms that operated in concert with 
regulatory changes. In some domains, social norms have helped to 
promote compliance with law even without active enforcement.
268 
Public–private partnerships can be especially important in this 
domain, as those in the private sector emphasize norms that increase 
compliance with law and promote safer choices.  
Consider as well the problem of distracted driving. On October 1, 
2009, the President issued an Executive Order that bans federal 
employees from texting while driving.
269 Such steps can help promote a 
social norm against texting while driving, thus reducing risks. This 
same approach—emphasizing social norms—might be applied in 
many domains. In the domain of childhood obesity, for example, a 
social norm in favor of healthy eating and proper exercise
270 could 
produce significant health benefits. Here, as elsewhere, public–private 
partnerships can play a key role, with those in the private sector 
helping to spur emerging norms that promote better choices by and 
for children.  
In particular, the “Let’s Move” initiative has emphasized such 
partnerships. First Lady Michelle Obama has collaborated with 
Walmart to promote healthier choices.
271 As part of that initiative, 
Walmart has committed to reformulating thousands of everyday 
packaged food items by 2015 by reducing sodium 25 percent and 
added sugars 10 percent, and by removing all remaining industrially 
produced trans fats. Walmart has also committed to reduce the costs of 
healthier options, thus making those costs comparable to the costs of 
less healthy choices, and at the same time to reduce the costs of fruits 
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and vegetables.
272 Finally, Walmart has agreed to develop a “healthy 
seal” to help consumers to identify healthy choices.
273  
In a similar vein, a number of companies, including Kraft Foods, 
General Mills, Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and Kellogg, have pledged to remove 
1.5 trillion calories from their products by 2015, in an effort to combat 
childhood obesity.
274 The relevant steps include reduction of product 
sizes and introduction of lower calorie foods.
275 Finally, the Food 
Marketing Institute and the Grocery Manufacturers Association have 
agreed to promote informed choices through a “Nutrition Keys” label, 
designed in part to combat childhood obesity.
276 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Essay has been to outline some of the key 
findings in recent empirical research and to sketch potential 
implications for regulatory policy. A general conclusion is that while 
material incentives (including price and anticipated health effects) 
greatly matter, outcomes are independently influenced by (1) the 
social environment and (2) prevailing social norms.
277 When some 
people do well and others less so, it is often because the former, and 
not the latter, are able to benefit from aspects of the social 
environment, and from prevailing norms, that enable them to take for 
granted, and perhaps not even to think much about, a set of practices 
that serve them well. 
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While disclosure of information is an important regulatory tool, 
steps must be taken to ensure that disclosure will be not merely 
technically accurate but also meaningful and helpful. Such steps 
require careful attention to how people process and use information. 
It is important to distinguish between summary disclosure, typically 
provided at the point of purchase, and full disclosure, typically 
provided on the Internet. Summary disclosure should be clear, simple, 
and salient, and it should emphasize factors that actually matter to 
people (such as the annual dollar value of fuel economy or energy-
efficient choices).  
Full disclosure should provide information that can be used in 
multiple ways, thus improving the operation of markets. Often the 
most important uses come from the private sector, which may 
promote comparison shopping among multiple options. Some 
noteworthy recent efforts allow people to see the nature and effects of 
their own past choices and to understand the likely effects of different 
choices in the future. In all cases, disclosure is most useful if it informs 
people of what, precisely, they might do in order to avoid significant 
risks or obtain significant benefits. 
Default rules can greatly affect social outcomes, and in some 
circumstances, sensible defaults can serve as a complement or 
alternative to mandates and bans. One of the advantages of well-
chosen default rules is that they can simplify and ease choices—for 
example, by producing automatic enrollment in programs that are 
generally beneficial while also allowing people to opt out. A potential 
problem is that those who design default rules may not know which 
rule is best and one size may not fit all. At least when the relevant 
group is diverse and the domain is familiar, active choosing is likely to 
be preferable to default rules.  
Because complexity can often have undesirable or unintended 
side effects—including high costs, noncompliance with law, and 
reduced participation in useful programs—simplification may well 
help to promote regulatory goals. Indeed, simplification can often 
have surprisingly large effects. Reduced paperwork and form-filling 
burdens (as, for example, through fewer questions, use of skip patterns, 
electronic filing, and prepopulation) can produce significant benefits. 
It may also be desirable to ease participation in both private and 
public programs by increasing convenience and by giving people 
clearer signals about what, exactly, they are required to do. 
People are far more likely to respond when certain facts, risks, or 
possibilities are salient; effective warnings take account of this fact. 
Finally, regulation can work in concert with social norms, helping to 
promote agreed-upon public goals and to increase compliance with 
legal requirements. Public–private partnerships, enlisting the initiative 1412  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
and the creativity of the private sector, can be especially helpful in this 
regard. 2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1413 
APPENDIX A
278 
Executive Order 13563 of January 18, 2011  
Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review  
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution 
and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to improve 
regulation and regulatory review, it is hereby ordered as follows:  
SECTION 1. General Principles of Regulation. (a) Our regulatory 
system must protect public health, welfare, safety, and our 
environment while promoting economic growth, innovation, 
competitiveness, and job creation. It must be based on the best 
available science. It must allow for public participation and an open 
exchange of ideas. It must promote predictability and reduce 
uncertainty. It must identify and use the best, most innovative, and 
least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory ends. It must take into 
account benefits and costs, both quantitative and qualitative. It must 
ensure that regulations are accessible, consistent, written in plain 
language, and easy to understand. It must measure, and seek to 
improve, the actual results of regulatory requirements.  
(b) This order is supplemental to and reaffirms the principles, 
structures, and definitions governing contemporary regulatory review 
that were established in Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 
1993. As stated in that Executive Order and to the extent permitted by 
law, each agency must, among other things: (1) propose or adopt a 
regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify 
its costs (recognizing that some benefits and costs are difficult to 
quantify); (2) tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on 
society, consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives, taking into 
account, among other things, and to the extent practicable, the costs of 
cumulative regulations; (3) select, in choosing among alternative 
regulatory approaches, those approaches that maximize net benefits 
(including potential economic, environmental, public health and 
safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity); (4) to 
the extent feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than 
specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated 
entities must adopt; and (5) identify and assess available alternatives 
to direct regulation, including providing economic incentives to 
encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable 
permits, or providing information upon which choices can be made by 
the public.  
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(c) In applying these principles, each agency is directed to use the 
best available techniques to quantify anticipated present and future 
benefits and costs as accurately as possible. Where appropriate and 
permitted by law, each agency may consider (and discuss qualitatively) 
values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, 
human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.  
SEC.  2.  Public Participation. (a) Regulations shall be adopted 
through a process that involves public participation. To that end, 
regulations shall be based, to the extent feasible and consistent with 
law, on the open exchange of information and perspectives among 
State, local, and tribal officials, experts in relevant disciplines, affected 
stakeholders in the private sector, and the public as a whole.  
(b) To promote that open exchange, each agency, consistent with 
Executive Order 12866 and other applicable legal requirements, shall 
endeavor to provide the public with an opportunity to participate in 
the regulatory process. To the extent feasible and permitted by law, 
each agency shall afford the public a meaningful opportunity to 
comment through the Internet on any proposed regulation, with a 
comment period that should generally be at least 60 days. To the 
extent feasible and permitted by law, each agency shall also provide, 
for both proposed and final rules, timely online access to the 
rulemaking docket on regulations.gov, including relevant scientific and 
technical findings, in an open format that can be easily searched and 
downloaded. For proposed rules, such access shall include, to the 
extent feasible and permitted by law, an opportunity for public 
comment on all pertinent parts of the rulemaking docket, including 
relevant scientific and technical findings.  
(c) Before issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking, each agency, 
where feasible and appropriate, shall seek the views of those who are 
likely to be affected, including those who are likely to benefit from 
and those who are potentially subject to such rulemaking.  
SEC. 3. Integration and Innovation. Some sectors and industries 
face a significant number of regulatory requirements, some of which 
may be redundant, inconsistent, or overlapping. Greater coordination 
across agencies could reduce these requirements, thus reducing costs 
and simplifying and harmonizing rules. In developing regulatory 
actions and identifying appropriate approaches, each agency shall 
attempt to promote such coordination, simplification, and 
harmonization. Each agency shall also seek to identify, as appropriate, 
means to achieve regulatory goals that are designed to promote 
innovation.  
SEC.  4.  Flexible Approaches. Where relevant, feasible, and 
consistent with regulatory objectives, and to the extent permitted by 
law, each agency shall identify and consider regulatory approaches 2011]  Empirically Informed Regulation 1415 
that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice for 
the public. These approaches include warnings, appropriate default 
rules, and disclosure requirements as well as provision of information 
to the public in a form that is clear and intelligible.  
SEC. 5. Science. Consistent with the President's Memorandum for 
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, “Scientific 
Integrity” (March 9, 2009), and its implementing guidance, each 
agency shall ensure the objectivity of any scientific and technological 
information and processes used to support the agency's regulatory 
actions.  
SEC. 6. Retrospective Analyses of Existing Rules. (a) To facilitate 
the periodic review of existing significant regulations, agencies shall 
consider how best to promote retrospective analysis of rules that may 
be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and 
to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with what 
has been learned. Such retrospective analyses, including supporting 
data, should be released online whenever possible.  
(b) Within 120 days of the date of this order, each agency shall 
develop and submit to the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs a preliminary plan, consistent with law and its resources and 
regulatory priorities, under which the agency will periodically review 
its existing significant regulations to determine whether any such 
regulations should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed so 
as to make the agency's regulatory program more effective or less 
burdensome in achieving the regulatory objectives.  
SEC.  7.  General Provisions. (a) For purposes of this order, 
“agency” shall have the meaning set forth in section 3(b) of Executive 
Order 12866.  
(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or 
otherwise affect:  
(i) authority granted by law to a department or agency, or the 
head thereof; or  
(ii) functions of the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative 
proposals.  
(c) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable 
law and subject to the availability of appropriations.  
(d) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right 
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity 
by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or 
entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.  1416  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
APPENDIX B
279 
In the Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 
issued on January 21, 2009, the President called for the establishment 
of “a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration.” 
The Memorandum required the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) to issue an Open Government Directive “that 
instructs executive departments and agencies to take specific actions 
implementing the principles set forth in this memorandum.” 
Following the President’s Memorandum, OMB’s Open 
Government Directive requires a series of concrete measures to 
implement the commitments to transparency, participation, and 
collaboration.  Section 4 of the Directive specifically instructs the 
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to 
“review existing OMB policies . . . to identify impediments to open 
government and to the use of new technologies and, where necessary, 
issue clarifying guidance and/or propose revisions to such policies, to 
promote greater openness in government.” 
Executive Order 12866 directs agencies “to foster the 
development of effective, innovative, and least burdensome 
regulations” (Section 6(a)(2)), and to “identify and assess available 
alternatives to direct regulation, including . . . providing information 
upon which choices can be made by the public” (Section 1(b)(3)). 
Executive Order 12866 also directs agencies to analyze “potentially 
effective and reasonably feasible alternatives to the planned 
regulation, identified by the agencies or the public (including 
improving the current regulation and reasonably viable nonregulatory 
actions)” (Section 6(a)(3)(C)(iii)).  
The purpose of the following documents is to set out guidance to 
inform the use of disclosure and simplification in the regulatory 
process. To the extent permitted by law, and where appropriate in light 
of the problem to which they are attempting to respond, agencies 
should follow the relevant principles.  
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DISCLOSURE AS A REGULATORY TOOL 
PURPOSE. In many statutes, Congress requires or permits 
agencies to use disclosure as a regulatory tool. Executive Order 12866 
provides, “Each agency shall identify and assess available alternatives 
to direct regulation, including . . . providing information upon which 
choices can be made by the public.” The Open Government Directive 
of the Office of Management and Budget calls for disclosures that will 
“further the core mission of the agency.” The purpose of this guidance 
is to set forth principles designed to assist agencies in their efforts to 
use information disclosure to achieve their regulatory objectives. 
Agencies should follow the principles outlined here in accordance 
with their own authorities, judgments, and goals, to the extent 
permitted by law. 
DISCLOSURE AS A REGULATORY  TOOL. Sometimes Congress 
requires or authorizes agencies to impose disclosure requirements 
instead of, or in addition to, mandates, subsidies, or bans. For example, 
automobile companies are required by law to disclose miles per gallon 
(MPG) ratings for new vehicles, and a standardized Nutrition Facts 
panel must be included on most food packages. The goal of disclosing 
such information is to provide members of the public with relevant 
information at the right moment in time, usually when a decision is 
made. Often that decision is whether to purchase a particular product. 
Well-designed disclosure policies attempt to convey information 
clearly and at the time when it is needed. People have limited time, 
attention, and resources for seeking out new information, and it is 
important to ensure that relevant information is salient and easy to 
find and to understand. There is a difference between making a 
merely technical disclosure—that is, making information available 
somewhere and in some form, regardless of its usefulness—and 
actually informing choices. Well-designed disclosure policies are 
preceded by a careful analysis of their likely effects. 
There are two general types of release that Congress may require 
or permit: summary disclosure and full disclosure. With summary 
disclosure, often required at the point of purchase, agencies highlight 
the most relevant information in order to increase the likelihood that 
people will see it, understand it, and act in accordance with what they 
have learned. Full disclosure is more comprehensive; it occurs when 
agencies release, or require others to release, all relevant information 
(often including underlying data). 
SUMMARY  DISCLOSURE. With summary disclosure, agencies 
attempt to provide people with clear, salient information at or near 
the time that relevant decisions are made. Examples include 
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government provision of information (e.g., fact sheets, telephone 
hotlines, and public interest announcements). 
Principle One: In order to select which information to highlight 
and how to present that information, agencies should explicitly identify 
their goals. Explicit identification of goals will have important 
implications for the nature of disclosure. If the goal is to discourage 
behavior by informing people that certain activities or products 
impose certain risks (for example, tobacco smoking), agencies should 
decide whether they seek to use vivid descriptions and persuasive 
images or merely to disclose relevant facts. If the goal is to present a 
warning, then graphic messages might be justified; the same is not true 
when the aim is simply to inform. And if the goal is to present a 
warning, it will often be useful to inform users of the precise steps that 
they might take, or the plans that they might formulate, to avoid the 
risk in question. Warnings (and disclosures in general) are most 
effective when people have a clear and specific sense of an 
appropriate course of action. They are likely to be less effective when 
the appropriate course of action is abstract, vague, or ambiguous. 
Principle Two: Summary disclosure should generally be simple and 
specific, and should avoid undue detail or excessive complexity. 
Summary disclosure should focus on the central issues and should be 
presented in a manner that is straightforward and easy to understand. 
Simple, specific disclosure is generally preferable. People have limited 
time and attention, and their reactions to new information are not 
always predictable. If information is unduly complex and detailed, 
there is a risk that it will not be carefully read or processed, especially 
if the relevant area is technical or new and unfamiliar. Agencies 
should be aware of the importance of how information is presented; if 
a potential outcome is presented as a loss, for example, people may 
pay more attention than if it is presented as a gain. Effective 
disclosure also avoids abstraction and ambiguity. Summary disclosure 
should be designed so as to be relevant to the affected population, 
enabling people to know why and how the information is pertinent to 
their own choices. 
Principle Three: Summary disclosure should be accurate and in 
plain language. By its very nature, summary disclosure can be 
misleading; a summary of complex material might give undue 
prominence to isolated aspects of a product or a context, and might 
divert attention from what most matters. Summary disclosure should 
be designed to be as fair and accurate as possible. Summary disclosure 
should also avoid jargon, technical language, or extraneous 
information. Each of these is distracting and threatens to turn away or 
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Principle Four: Disclosed information should be properly placed 
and timed. Careful thought should be given to the time and location of 
summary disclosure. Agencies should attempt to offer the information 
that users need when they need it. To this end, they should take steps 
to provide people with relevant information when they are actually 
making the decision or taking the action in question. For example, 
information about fuel economy is most useful if it is present and 
visible when people are shopping for motor vehicles. Similarly, 
summary disclosure should be provided in a prominent place, so that 
it will actually come to people’s attention. 
Principle Five: Summary disclosure through ratings or scales 
should be meaningful. Summary disclosure may involve numerical 
ratings or scales, because these are convenient ways to simplify and 
display complicated information. For nutrition, percent daily values 
are a common example of this sort of summary disclosure. When users 
understand what such scales mean, they can be among the most 
effective ways to communicate information. But if the scales are 
unclear or poorly designed, people may have a difficult time knowing 
what to make of the information; they might fail to incorporate it into 
their choices or draw the wrong conclusions. Agencies should select 
numbers and scales that are meaningful to users. For example, the 
Energy Guide label provides an estimate of annual operating cost, 
along with a cost range for similar models. Annual savings or benefits, 
measured in terms of dollars, provide a metric that is both meaningful 
and easy to understand. When monetary values are at stake, agencies 
should give careful consideration to disclosure of savings or benefits 
in terms of dollars. 
Principle Six: To the extent feasible, agencies should test, in 
advance, the likely effects of summary disclosure, and should also 
monitor the effects of such disclosure over time. For all significant 
summary disclosure, it is important to observe whether and how 
people react to a given piece of information. To the extent feasible, 
and when existing knowledge is inadequate, agencies should consider 
several alternative methods of disclosure and test them before 
imposing a disclosure requirement. Scientifically valid experiments 
are generally preferable to focus group testing, and randomized 
experiments can be especially valuable. When focus groups are used, 
they should attempt to elicit information about actual choices and 
behavior (rather than simply reactions to or preferences for labels and 
formats). Consultation with experts can also be a valuable supplement 
to focus group testing. 
Consistent with available resources, an agency requiring or 
making a disclosure should also consider performing market surveys 
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These studies should determine whether users are aware of the 
disclosure, whether they understand the disclosure, whether they 
remember the relevant information when they need it, whether they 
have changed their behavior because of the disclosure, and, if so, how. 
Agencies should be aware that users might not report their behavior 
accurately; self-reports may be misleading. To the extent possible, 
agencies should attempt to verify whether reported changes are 
actually occurring (for example, through empirical study of practices 
or through surveys that reliably measure behavior). 
With respect to summary disclosure, agencies will often be able to 
learn more over time. A disclosure requirement that seems promising 
at one stage may turn out to be less effective than anticipated. A 
disclosure requirement that was effective at an early stage may turn 
out to have less or little impact as time passes. New strategies will 
often emerge as experience accumulates and circumstances change. 
Agencies should be open to fresh evidence and consider new 
approaches to the extent feasible and as the evidence warrants. 
Principle Seven: Where feasible and appropriate, agencies should 
identify and consider the likely costs and benefits of disclosure 
requirements. Executive Order 12866 requires agencies, to the extent 
permitted by law, “to assess both the costs and the benefits of the 
intended regulation” and “recognizing that some costs and benefits 
are difficult to quantify,” to proceed only “upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the 
costs.” In accordance with this requirement, and where feasible and 
appropriate in the circumstances, agencies should adopt disclosure 
requirements only after considering both qualitative and quantitative 
benefits and costs. That assessment should, in turn, help agencies to 
decide which requirements to select. 
It is important to acknowledge that in some contexts, the costs 
and benefits of disclosure may be difficult or even impossible to 
specify, and a formal analysis may not be feasible or appropriate. 
Quantitative assessment of benefits may involve a high degree of 
speculation, and a qualitative discussion, based on available evidence, 
may be all that is feasible. In assessing benefits, agencies should 
consider the fact that improvements in welfare are a central goal of 
disclosure requirements, but should also note that informed choice is a 
value in itself (even if it is difficult to quantify that value). 
It is also important to recognize that people may react differently 
to disclosure requirements. While some consumers might use calorie 
information to reduce their overall calorie intake, others might not. 
Heterogeneity can have potentially significant effects; those who have 
the most to gain or to lose may or may not be benefiting from the 
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behavior and preferences into account when formulating disclosure 
policies and assessing their likely consequences. 
FULL DISCLOSURE. Sometimes Congress requires or authorizes 
agencies to promote regulatory goals by disclosing, or by requiring 
others to disclose, a wide range of information about existing practices 
and their effects. Full disclosure will include far more detail than is 
available in a summary. It may well include multiple variables, 
supporting data, and materials that extend over long periods of time. 
For example, agencies use the Internet to provide detailed 
information about fuel economy and nutrition; such information is far 
more comprehensive than what is provided through summary 
disclosure. 
Full disclosure can often promote the purposes of open 
government, including transparency, participation, and collaboration. 
The central goals of full disclosure are to allow individuals and 
organizations to view the data and to analyze, use, and repackage it in 
multiple ways, typically taking advantage of emerging technological 
capacities (perhaps including social media). To promote those goals, 
agencies should consider the following principles. 
Principle One: Disclosed information should be as accessible as 
possible. For that reason, the Internet should ordinarily be used as a 
means of disclosing information, to the extent feasible and consistent 
with law. Transparency is generally good practice, and agencies cannot 
always know which information will be most useful and in what 
format it will prove most valuable. Engaging in full disclosure (to the 
extent feasible, subject to valid restrictions, and to the extent 
permitted by law) is often both desirable and important. 
Full disclosure will frequently involve large amounts of 
complicated data, and most people may not find it worth their time to 
seek out and analyze all or most of it. In such cases, the data may be 
most directly useful to groups and organizations with technical 
capabilities and with an interest in obtaining, analyzing, and 
repackaging relevant information. Such groups and organizations may 
reorganize and disseminate the information in ways that turn out to 
be highly beneficial to the general public (sometimes by improving 
the operation of markets). At the same time, agencies should strive to 
make full disclosure as useful as possible, and should therefore 
promote clarity and accessibility. 
Principle Two: Disclosed information should be as usable as 
possible. For that reason, information should usually be released in an 
electronic format that does not require specialized software. Consistent 
with the goals of open government, it is important to make 
information not merely available but also usable. If information is 
made available electronically, it will be easier for people to sift 1422  The University of Chicago Law Review  [78:1349 
through it and to analyze or repackage it in various ways. Agencies 
should select an electronic format that is suitable to achieving that 
goal. The best method should be chosen in light of existing technology. 
At the present time, a structured XML format is conducive to this 
purpose. 
Principle Three: Agencies should consider making periodic 
assessments of whether full disclosure is as accurate and useful as 
possible. Where feasible and to the extent consistent with relevant 
laws, regulations, and policies (including protection of privacy), 
agencies should consider steps to investigate whether current 
disclosure policies are fulfilling their intended purposes. They might 
explore, for example, what information is being frequently used by the 
public and how those in the private sector are adapting and presenting 
information. By so doing, agencies can improve their disclosure 
policies and practices after learning about the value of particular 
information to the public. Similar forms of continuing assessment 
might prove useful for summary disclosure as well. 
Agencies should also consider whether it might be useful to seek 
public comment on significant disclosures. As appropriate, agencies 
might use the Federal Register to obtain such comment. The public 
comment period associated with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 
44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq., might also be used for this purpose. Agencies 
might consider requesting public comment on the following: 
1) The quality of the information; 
2) The usefulness of the information; 
3) Other related information the agency should collect and/or 
disclose; and 
4) Means of improving disclosure, such as more effective 
methods for collecting, organizing, analyzing, and 
disseminating information.  
Principle Four:  Where feasible and appropriate, agencies should 
consider the costs and benefits of full disclosure. As noted above, 
Executive Order 12866 requires agencies, to the extent permitted by 
law, “to assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended 
regulation” and to proceed only upon “a reasoned determination that 
the benefits of the intended regulation justify the costs.” In addition, 
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 imposes a series of 
requirements on efforts to collect information; these requirements are 
designed (among other things) to increase the practical utility of 
information collections and to minimize burdens on the private sector. 
In accordance with these requirements, and to the extent feasible and 
appropriate, agencies should evaluate full disclosure in terms of both 
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Here, as with summary disclosure, quantitative assessment of 
benefits may involve a degree of speculation, and a qualitative 
discussion, based on available evidence, may be all that is feasible. In 
assessing benefits, agencies should consider the fact that 
improvements in welfare are a central goal of disclosure requirements, 
that informed choice is also a value in itself (even if it is difficult to 
quantify that value), and that full disclosure may effectively 
complement and improve on summary disclosure. It is also important 
to recognize that significant benefits may be associated with 
recombining information in new and different ways, even if 
quantification of those benefits is difficult. 
SUMMARY DISCLOSURE AND FULL DISCLOSURE. Congress may 
require or authorize agencies to require summary disclosure but not 
full disclosure; alternatively, Congress may require or authorize 
agencies to require full disclosure but not summary disclosure. When 
Congress grants agencies discretion, and to the extent feasible, they 
should consider the likely effects—including the qualitative and 
quantitative costs and benefits—of both approaches. 
Summary disclosure is the best method for informing consumers 
at the point of decision. Full disclosure is the best method of allowing 
groups and individuals access to a broad range of information, 
allowing them to analyze and disseminate that information in creative 
ways, and to use it to inform private and public decisions or otherwise 
to promote statutory goals. The two approaches may well be 
complementary. For example, it may be desirable to use summary 
disclosure at the point of purchase while also making full information 
available on the Internet. 
SIMPLIFICATION AS A REGULATORY TOOL 
PURPOSE. In some statutes, Congress requires or permits 
agencies to simplify regulatory requirements. In other statutes, 
Congress requires or permits agencies to use default rules, such as 
automatic enrollment, to simplify people’s decisions and to promote 
regulatory objectives. Executive Order 12866 provides, “Each agency 
shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation.” It 
also provides, “Each agency shall draft its regulations to be simple and 
easy to understand, with the goal of minimizing the potential for 
uncertainty and litigation arising from such uncertainty.” It adds, 
“When an agency determines that a regulation is the best available 
method of achieving the regulatory objective, it shall design its 
regulations in the most cost-effective manner to achieve the 
regulatory objective.” 
The purpose of this guidance is to set forth principles designed to 
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Agencies should follow the principles outlined here in accordance 
with their own authorities, judgments, and goals, to the extent 
permitted by law. 
SIMPLIFICATION AND DEFAULT  RULES. In recent years, 
significant attention has been given to the possibility of improving 
outcomes by easing and simplifying people’s choices. Sometimes this 
goal can be achieved by reducing complexity, ambiguity, and 
paperwork burdens; sometimes it can be achieved by selecting 
appropriate starting points or “default rules.” A default rule (such as 
automatic enrollment) specifies the outcome in a given situation if 
people make no choice at all. 
In the domain of savings for retirement, for example, private and 
public employers might create an “opt in” system, in which employees 
do not reserve any of their salary for savings unless they affirmatively 
elect to do so (and hence opt in). Alternatively, employers might 
create an “opt out” system, in which a certain amount of salary is 
placed in a retirement plan unless employees affirmatively elect not to 
participate in the plan. Default rules play a large role in many 
domains. Both private and public institutions make numerous choices 
between opt-in and opt-out design. 
Considerable evidence suggests that the choice of the default rule 
can have a significant effect on behavior and outcomes, even if it is 
simple and essentially costless to opt in or opt out. A typical finding is 
that under an opt-in system, fewer people are likely to participate 
than in an opt-out system. One reason is that inertia can be a powerful 
force; people may procrastinate or decline to make the effort to 
rethink the default option. Another reason is that the default rule 
might be taken to carry an implied endorsement by those who have 
chosen it; people may not depart from the default rule on the ground 
that it might have been selected because it is helpful or appropriate. 
Whatever the reason, it is clear that in some contexts, the chosen 
default rule can have significant effects, perhaps more significant than 
alternative possibilities, including disclosure of relevant information 
and even monetary incentives. It follows that if, for example, the 
relevant goal is to enable people to increase savings, an opt-out 
regime could be helpful for achieving that goal (as many private 
employers have found). 
Instead of choosing opt in or opt out, private or public 
institutions might select a distinctive approach, which is to require 
“active choosing.” Under this approach, no default rule is put in place. 
People are asked to make an explicit statement of their preference 
among the alternatives. Compared to opt in, active choosing has been 
found to increase participation rates substantially. Agencies may wish 
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means of promoting their objectives. If, for example, agencies are 
uncertain about which default rule will be best for the public, or if any 
default rule creates risks, requiring active choices may be an attractive 
alternative. 
More generally, people may not participate in important 
programs simply because the required steps for participation are 
complex and daunting; agencies can often improve outcomes by 
reducing unnecessary paperwork burdens and by simplifying choices. 
For example, many agencies have taken active steps to dispense with 
paper and to allow people to use electronic forms (“fillable fileable,” 
including electronic signatures). Others have reduced burdens by 
eliminating unnecessary questions, using skip patterns, allowing 
“prepopulation” of forms, authorizing less frequent reporting, and 
eliminating redundancy. 
In making choices among possible approaches, agencies should 
consider the following principles, to the extent permitted by law. 
Principle One: To promote regulatory goals, agencies should 
consider whether it is appropriate to use default rules (such as 
automatic enrollment) as a substitute for, or as a supplement to, 
mandates or bans. In some contexts, appropriate default rules have 
advantages over mandates and bans, because they preserve freedom 
of choice. Sometimes people’s situations are diverse and a mandate is 
poorly suited to individual circumstances; a default rule has the virtue 
of permitting people to adjust as they see fit. And when the statutory 
goal is to improve outcomes without imposing firm mandates, a 
default rule may be simpler, more effective, and less costly than other 
possibilities. 
Sometimes, of course, the law requires certain behavior (often to 
prevent harms to third parties), and in such cases, a default rule may 
not be sufficient. But in such contexts, default rules may be useful and 
complementary. If, for example, people are required by law to engage 
in certain behavior, it may be both useful and appropriate to select the 
default rule that promotes compliance and best achieves the 
regulatory objective. Such an approach can increase ease and 
simplicity for those who are asked to comply with the law. 
Principle Two: When choosing among potential default rules, 
agencies should attempt to specify their likely effects, and should 
identify the rule that would most benefit the relevant population. 
According to standard economic theory, a default rule should 
generally have little or no effect, at least if it is not burdensome or 
costly for people to depart from it. But empirical evidence suggests 
that in many contexts, outcomes are significantly affected by the 
choice of default rules. Many people will not opt in to a certain 
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When choosing the appropriate default rule, agencies should 
attempt to specify and assess the likely effects of the alternative 
possibilities (including, to the extent  feasible and permitted by law, 
both qualitative and quantitative costs and benefits, in accordance 
with Executive Order 12866). An important question is whether most 
people in the relevant population would benefit from participation in 
the pertinent program or activity. This question will not always be 
easy. It should ordinarily be answered by asking what most people 
would choose if they had adequate information. And if one set of 
outcomes is required by law, agencies should consider selecting a 
default rule that would simplify and promote compliance. 
One approach to the choice of default rule is to choose a general 
rule that will apply to all of the relevant population, subject of course 
to opt in or opt out. An alternative approach is more personalized, in 
the sense that it attempts to distinguish among, and to suit the diverse 
situations of, members of the affected group. For example, geographic 
or demographic information (such as age) might be taken into 
account if it helps to increase the likelihood that the default rule will 
be suited to the situations of those to whom it applies. Agencies might 
consider a personalized approach if they have good reason to believe 
that such an approach would more accurately reflect the informed 
judgments of members of the affected population. On the other hand, 
agencies should avoid a personalized approach if the underlying 
categories would be too crude or inconsistent with relevant laws, 
regulations, or policies, such as those involving privacy. 
Principle Three: Agencies should consider active choosing as an 
alternative to a specified default rule, especially when the relevant group 
is diverse and appropriately informed. In some cases, it may be difficult 
for agencies to be confident about which default rule will be best for 
the public or the relevant population; they may lack adequate 
information. In such cases, active choosing might well be preferable. 
This approach avoids a specified default rule. Instead, active choosing 
asks people to make an explicit selection of the option that they 
prefer. 
Active choosing has particular advantages over a default rule 
when preferences and situations are diverse and heterogeneous, so 
that a single approach does not fit all. To that extent, active choosing 
can be preferable to either an opt-in or an opt-out regime. And when 
preferences and circumstances are diverse, a default rule may have the 
disadvantage of giving uniform treatment to differently situated 
people. More personalized default rules may avoid some of the 
problems of a uniform default rule, but when agencies lack full 
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These points also suggest the circumstances in which a default 
rule might be preferred to active choosing. Where agencies have 
reason to be confident about the appropriate default rule, and when 
preferences and situations are not relevantly diverse, active choosing 
may not be the best approach; a default rule might be best. Where the 
situation is unfamiliar, highly technical, and complex, a default rule 
might be preferred to active choosing, to the extent that the latter 
approach requires people to make decisions for which they lack 
experience and expertise. Provision of information might, of course, 
help to reduce the latter problem. Agencies should consider whether 
existing evidence provides a basis for deciding between a specified 
default rule and active choosing, or whether it is appropriate to 
attempt to obtain such evidence. Assessment of likely effects, 
including both qualitative and quantitative costs and benefits, will 
prove useful in making that decision. 
Principle Four: Agencies should consider how best to eliminate 
unnecessary complexity and to simplify people’s choices. In some cases, 
a default rule will not fit with the relevant law or help solve the 
problem with which agencies are concerned. In such cases, agencies 
should nonetheless take steps to eliminate undue complexity and 
should attempt, where appropriate and consistent with law, to simplify 
and ease people’s decisions. 
For example, burdensome paperwork requirements can impose 
large costs on the private and public sectors, have unintended adverse 
effects, reduce compliance, and prevent significant numbers of people 
from participating in relevant programs. Consistent with the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq., and the 
Government Paperwork Elimination Act, 44 U.S.C. 3504, and to the 
extent permitted by law, agencies should attempt to reduce such 
requirements by eliminating unnecessary, ambiguous, excessive, and 
redundant questions; by permitting electronic filing (including 
electronic signatures); by allowing “prepopulation” of forms, where 
appropriate and feasible by sharing information across offices or 
agencies; and by promoting administrative simplification by 
coordinating and reducing requirements from multiple offices and 
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APPENDIX C
280 
AGENCY CHECKLIST: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
With this document, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
is providing a checklist to assist agencies in producing regulatory 
impact analyses (RIAs), as required for economically significant rules 
by Executive Order 12866 and OMB Circular A-4. 
Nothing herein alters, adds to, or reformulates existing requirements in 
any way. Moreover, this checklist is limited to the requirements of 
Executive Order 12866 (available at: http://www.reginfo.gov/public 
/jsp/Utilities/EO_12866.pdf) and Circular A-4 (available at: http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf); it does not address 
requirements imposed by other authorities, such as the National 
Environmental Policy Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, and 
various Executive Orders that require analysis. Executive Order 12866 
and Circular A-4, as well as those other authorities, should be consulted 
for further information.  
Checklist for Regulatory Impact Analysis:  
• Does the RIA include a reasonably detailed description of the 
need for the regulatory action? 
• Does the RIA include an explanation of how the regulatory 
action will meet that need? 
• Does the RIA use an appropriate baseline (i.e., best assessment 
of how the world would look in the absence of the proposed 
action)?  
• Is the information in the RIA based on the best reasonably 
obtainable scientific, technical, and economic information and is 
it presented in an accurate, clear, complete, and unbiased 
manner? 
• Are the data, sources, and methods used in the RIA provided 
to the public on the Internet so that a qualified person can 
reproduce the analysis? 
• To the extent feasible, does the RIA quantify and monetize the 
anticipated benefits from the regulatory action? 
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• To the extent feasible, does the RIA quantify and monetize the 
anticipated costs? 
• Does the RIA explain and support a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs 
(recognizing that some benefits and costs are difficult to 
quantify)? 
• Does the RIA assess the potentially effective and reasonably 
feasible alternatives? 
o Does the RIA assess the benefits and costs of different 
regulatory provisions separately if the rule includes a 
number of distinct provisions? 
o Does the RIA assess at least one alternative that is less 
stringent and at least one alternative that is more 
stringent? 
o Does the RIA consider setting different requirements 
for large and small firms? 
• Does the preferred option have the highest net benefits 
(including potential economic, environmental, public health and 
safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), 
unless a statute requires a different approach? 
• Does the RIA include an explanation of why the planned 
regulatory action is preferable  to the identified potential 
alternatives? 
• Does the RIA use appropriate discount rates for benefits and 
costs that are expected to occur in the future? 
• Does the RIA include, if and where relevant, an appropriate 
uncertainty analysis? 
• Does the RIA include, if and where relevant, a separate 
description of distributive impacts and equity? 
o Does the RIA provide a description/accounting of 
transfer payments? 
o Does the RIA analyze relevant effects on disadvantaged 
or vulnerable populations (e.g., disabled or poor)? 
• Does the analysis include a clear, plain-language executive 
summary, including an accounting statement that summarizes the 
benefit and cost estimates for the regulatory action under 
consideration, including the qualitative and non-monetized 
benefits and costs? 
• Does the analysis include a clear and transparent table 
presenting (to the extent feasible) anticipated benefits and costs 
(quantitative and qualitative)? 
 